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I began by thinking about procreative technology.1 But you can-
not think about procreative technology as such. The technology is
nearly indistinguishable from the stories about its uses.2 The stories
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. I am very grateful to those who en-
couraged me during this article's long thinking-out-loud stage: Taunya Banks, Adrienne
Davis, Laura Gomez, Angela Harris, Cheryl Harris, Casey Jarman, Randy Kandel,
Radhika Rao, Dorothy Roberts, and Reva Siegel. Special thanks to Alex Chun, Howard
Gross, Camille Loya; Craig Osaki, Daniel Levison, Mai-Phuong Bui, and Karen Cox for
their research assistance. Blessings on the heads of Sarah Tigerman, Heather Phillips, and
the other members of the Hastings Law Journal, for their help, their patience, and their
efforts at putting this symposium together.
1. I use the term "procreative technology" to refer to interventions such as artificial
insemination, in vitro fertilization, gamete intrafallopian transfer, zygote intrafallopian
transfer, etc., that are typically explained as means to enhance human fertility. I use the
terms "reproduce," "reproductive," and "reproduction," to signal the construction and
perpetuation of the socio-political meanings attached to procreation. Later, in the text of
this article, I examine the significance and effect of "technology." See infra notes 19-24 and
accompanying text.
2. Susan M. Squier, Reproducing the Posthunan Body: Ectogenetic Fetus, Surrogate
Mother, Pregnant Man, in Pos uiAN BODIES 113, 114-15 (Judith Halberstam & Ira Liv-
ingston eds., 1995). Squier notes that "[a] gap exists between the range of medical prac-
tices (actual and hypothetical) known as reproductive technology, such as AID, IVF,
Gamete Intrafallopian Tfransfer, Zygote Intrafallopian Transfer, Zona drilling, abdominal
pregnancy, cloning, and so on, and their representations." Id. These gaps have been well-
documented by those who have revealed the medicalization of pregnancy, the health risks
to women, the low success rates of reproductive technology, the use of women as experi-
mental subjects, the economic and physical exploitation of women, and the role of the
representations in the subordination of women. Id. at 115. For an early feminist critique of
the medicalization of pregnancy, see BARBARA E RENREIcH & DEiRDRE ENGLISH, FOR
HER OWN GOOD: 150 YEAR OF THE EXPERTS' ADvicE TO WOMEN (1978). For good
examples of anthologies presenting a feminist critique of procreative technologies as repro-
ductive control, see THE FuTu E OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION (Christine Overall ed., 1989);
REPRODUCTVE LAWS FOR THE 1990s (Sherrill Cohen & Nadine Taub eds., 1989); TE=r-
TUBE WOMEN: WHAT FutnuRE FOR MOT mEROOD? (Rita Arditti, Renate Duelli Klein, &
Shelley Minden eds., 1989). For good examples (in anthology or monograph form) of re-
cent developments in feminist critique of procreative technology use, see CONCE ViNG THE
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and the images embedded in the stories shift according to the context.
And, as philosopher Helen Longino has noted, "[e]ach contextual set-
ting would yield a different pattern of connections."'3 Since procrea-
tive technology is often characterized as infertility treatment, I am
interested in questioning the stories of in/fertility. It seems to me that
these stories are shaping public policy and law in direct and indirect
ways. So, in questioning the stories of in/fertility, I am trying to raise
questions about the public policy and law addressing in/fertility.
I use the slash (/) between "in" and "fertility" to signal that the
dominant understandings of infertility and the infertile are shaped
with respect to our understanding of fertility and the fertile. My in-
quiry takes for granted that human procreation, and in/fertility in par-
ticular, is a culturally significant site upon which political contests play
out.4 So my inquiry, more accurately, is not about the way the tech-
nology should be used. It is, rather, an effort to trace the pattern of
connections in the in/fertility discourses, formed largely by procreative
technology use.
I follow three threads in the stories and images, or discourses, if
you will, of in/fertility. The most obvious thread is that of the infertile,
who are usually identified as women.5 Perhaps not surprisingly, given
the binary, oppositional nature of master narratives, that thread leads
to the thread of the "too fertile," those women whose sexuality and
fertility are deemed deviant by dominant norms. The too fertile in-
clude unwed adult women, teens, welfare recipients, and/or women of
color. In fact, within the in/fertility discourses, all of these women are
too fertile. The third thread may be less apparent. While infertile
women and too fertile women have been made visible and obvious in
the in/fertility discourses, the fertility of those within the third
NEW WORLD ORDER: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION (Faye D. Ginsburg &
Rayna Rapp eds., 1995); BARBARA DUDEN, DISEMBODYING WOMEN: PERSPECTIVES ON
PREGNANCY AND THE UNBORN (Lee Hoinacki trans., 1993); BETSY HARTMANN, REPRO-
DUCrIVE RIGHTS AND WRONGS: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF POPULATION CONTROL AND
CONTRACEPTrvE CHOICE (rev. ed. 1995); JUDITH N. LASKER & SUSAN BORG, IN SEARCH
OF PARENTHOOD: COPING WITH INFERTILITY AND HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION (1989);
JANICE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE BAT-
TLE OVER WOMEN's FREEDOM (1993); REPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE LAW: FEMINIST
PERSPECtivEs (Joan C. Callahan ed., 1995); BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING
MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY (1989); PATRI-
CIA SPALLONE, BEYOND CONCEPTION: THE NEW POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION (1989).
3. Helen E. Longino, Knowledge, Bodies, and Values: Reproductive Technologies and
Their Scientific Context, in TECHNOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE 175,195 (An-
drew Feenberg & Alastair Hannay eds., 1995).
4. See Squier, supra note 2, at 118.
5. See infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
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thread-lesbians and gay men-has been made invisible or irrelevant.
I use the term "dysfertile" to suggest the dysfunction attributed to
lesbians and gay men by the in/fertility discourses.
In the inquiry that follows, I first look to moments in the public
discourse that reflect great unease with particular procreative technol-
ogy uses. I explore the shape of these debates to question why and
how some issues have been asked and answered, but not others.
These moments represent outside points in the boundaries of use. I
then examine the express and implicit content of the medical and legal
rules that currently comprise the official boundaries of use. I trace the
pattern of connections drawn by these rules to points squarely within
the boundaries-use by married couples to overcome infertility, and
then back to the edges-use by lesbians. The boundaries of use are
formed largely from identity constructs. It is through an exploration
of these identity constructs that I see the particularities of the bound-
ary maintenance mechanisms and how they operate on the interlock-
ing identifiers we know as race, gender, class, and sexual orientation.
At several points, certain identity patterns prove more liminal
than others. These liminalities offer two possibilities, one negative,
one positive. First, the constructs of womanhood that meld certain
acts and traits as appropriately feminine with whiteness form a wedge
that simultaneously maintains boundaries between white and non-
white and heterosexual and non-heterosexual. Very often, this wedge
also cuts on class lines in a way that melds whiteness with middle class
privilege and non-whiteness with poverty. Second, the splintering of
procreation that technology exacerbates, combined with the splinter-
ing of identity that technology enables, may effect the de-essentializa-
tion of women within the discourses of in/fertility.
I. Moments of Unease
There have been relatively few moments in which the public dis-
course6 has reflected widespread unease with developments in procre-
ative technology use. Two of those moments occurred upon the birth
6. There have been moments in which medical professionals have expressed such
unease. For example, the facts of Del Zio v. The Presbyterian Hospital reveal that a de-
partment chair, medical school dean, and hospital president, agreed to and did destroy in
vitro fertilized ova before they could be transferred to plaintiff, Mrs. Del Zio, in what
might have been the first in vitro fertilization procedure performed in the United States.
The defendants cited the danger to the potential human life, the experimental nature of the
procedure, violation of department rules, and the physicians' lack of competence to per-
form the procedure as reasons for their actions. Del Zio v. The Presbyterian Hospital, 74
Civ. 3588 (memorandum decision) (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
of Louise Brown, the world's first "test-tube baby," in 1978, and when
the Baby M surrogacy case came to public light in 1987.7 The birth of
Louise Brown provoked concerns about the use of technology to in-
tervene in human procreation, risks to the woman, risks to the child,
the use of selective abortion, the status and treatment of cry-
opreserved embryos, and the status and treatment of third party par-
ticipants in procreative technology use.8 But the birth of Elizabeth
Carr, the first child born after conception by in vitro fertilization and
embryo transfer in the United States,9 resulted in an immediate call
for federal support of test-tube conceptions. The moment of unease
was over. Overall, these births generated more positive excitement
about the possibilities for overcoming infertility1° than concern about
the risks of in vitro fertilization.1
The controversy surrounding the Baby M case was framed in
terms of two issues: who should be the parents of Baby M, and should
surrogacy be regulated at law. At the time, state legislatures and legal
scholars busily debated and proposed a variety of regulatory ap-
proaches to surrogacy and procreative technology use. Since the New
Jersey Supreme Court issued its decision condemning the commercial
and contractual aspects of surrogacy,12 few states have actually en-
acted these proposals into law.' 3 The moment of asking whether the
7. For many legal scholars, the key moment in this case was the New Jersey Supreme
Court's decision. in re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). For the media and public,
however, the 1987 trial supplied the key moments. The trial court held that the surrogacy
contract was valid and issued orders to carry out the contractual terms. Id. at 1237-38. The
court also ordered that the parental rights of Mary Beth Whitehead, the surrogate mother,
be terminated, granted sole custody to William Stern, the sperm donor and intended fa-
ther, and entered an order allowing Elizabeth Stern, the intended mother, to adopt the
child. Id.
8. See Hans 0. Tiefel, Human In Vitro Fertilization: A Conservative View, 247
JAMA 3235 (1982), for a review of the ethical objections to the means and ends of in vitro
fertilization and embryo transfer.
9. Elizabeth Carr was born in December 1981, in Norfolk, Virginia. ROBERT BLANK
& JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES, AND CON-
FLICTING RIGHTs 89 (1995). The physicians who performed the procedure resulting in her
conception were Howard and Georgeana Jones. For other references to Dr. Howard
Jones, see infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
10. NAOMI PFEFFER, THE STORK AND THE SYRINGE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF REPRO-
DUCrIVE CONTROL 27 (1993).
11. For additional discussion of how procreative technology came to be seen as an
infertility treatment rather than as a potential health or moral threat, or as a possibility of
reformulating family, see infra part HI.
12. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1234 (holding the surrogacy contract unenforceable and
in violation of adoption law bans on child selling and as against public policy concerns
regarding welfare of children and the degradation of women).
13. See infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
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technology should be used ended quickly, just as it did after the birth
of Louise Brown. Instead, much of the discourse about procreative
technology use has focused on the former issue: who should be the
legal parents. This clearly assumes that procreative technology will be
used.
The tendency to assume that procreative technology use only
raises the question of parental identity may stem from the fact that
the public debates have largely developed around highly publicized
lawsuits. In these lawsuits, the issue has not been whether a particular
technology should be used, but how we should deal with the results of
its use-the child. It is also true that many participants in the public
debate have been lawyers and legal scholars who tend, by training,
toward problem-solving with rule and outcome-oriented analysis. In
addition to the possibility that the legal mindset might be determining
the focal point of public discourse, there may be an assumption about
the inevitability of technological development at work. That is, the
public discourse-focus on the question of who should be the parent
may be premised on a general attitude that if technology is developed,
it will be used.14 This assumption may or may not contain a judgment
about the desirability of new technology use. In other words, the as-
sumption that the technology will be used may generate the need for
it, and not the reverse. If there is a technological imperative, the an-
swer to the question-whether procreative technologies should be
used-is a foregone conclusion.15
There may be something even more deeply embedded in the
question of who should be the parents. The question seems less inevi-
table when one considers the phrasing-who should be, rather than
who are the parents. The phrasing admits that there is no one clear
answer. Many, in fact, have supported procreative technology use as a
means of reformulating family structures and rethinking family
roles.' 6 That this discussion could take place among so many different
14. Many agree that the convergence of public attitude and scientific desire to support
technology development is not a coincidence. See RAYMOND, supra note 2, at 108-37
(describing the marketing of new reproductive technologies).
15. This partially explains why feminist critiques that question the desirability of pro-
creative technology use have not resonated in public discourse. Of course, the fact that the
public discourse has marginalized the feminist critiques indicates that patriarchy shapes the
debate and is the core of the resulting default to science. For further discussion of the
default to science, see Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection
of the Ideology of Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist
Mindset of Law, 53 Omo ST. L.J. 1205, 1286-93 (1992).
16. See eg., Robin Alta Charo, Biological Detenninism in Legal Decision Making:
The Parent Trap, 3 TEx. J. WOMEN & LAW 265 (1994); Janet L. Dolgin, The Law Debates
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proponents may not seem surprising. After all, many of the propo-
nents have been scholars deeply interested in family relations. Times
have changed, and attitudes toward marriage, homosexuality, and
gender roles have changed, so that many may be prepared to reject
traditional family structures as heteropatriarchal. The technology, es-
pecially surrogacy, has scrambled the types of biological links that can
be formed, raising questions about the means by which we have been
identifying family relations. On the other hand, adoption also offers
the opportunity to raise issues about reformulating the family. Why
has this question been raised and discussed so easily in the context of
procreative technology use and not in the context of adoption?
Until very recently, it has been widely assumed that adoption
would be used to create a family as much as possible like that of the
traditionally recognized family-marriage-based, with biological par-
ent-child relations.' 7 And yet, in adoption, the "normal" means of
identifying family relations-biology-is absent or scrambled. It may
be that the "should be" question raised by procreative technology use
has fueled the push to allow adoption by single persons and unmarried
couples, including lesbians and gay men.18 But, adoption is older. It
precedes the social changes that make the "should be" question possi-
ble. And it is already regulated at law, making change harder to
imagine.
I still think that there is an additional reason. It goes to the effect
of "technology" on our assumptions. Somehow, "technology" inter-
venes, at least temporarily, in our patterned ways of thinking about
boundaries of use.19 Adoption simply seems like an extension of ex-
isting social and legal practices. So we assume that the usual bounda-
ries-norms about appropriate family structure-apply. But we think
the Family: Reproductive Transformations, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 37 (1995); Randy
Frances Kandel, Which Came First: The Mother or the Egg? A Kinship Solution to Gesta-
tional Surrogacy, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 165 (1994).
17. This has begun to change. See, e.g., In re Petition of K.M. and D.M. to Adopt
Olivia M., 653 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. 1995) (permitting adoption by a lesbian couple); In re Jacob,
660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995) (permitting biological mother's partner to adopt as a steppar-
ent adoption); In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995) (allowing second parent
adoption by adoptive father's partner).
18. For analysis and argument supporting formation of parent-child relationships by
gay men and lesbians, see Lydia A. Nayo, In Nobody's Best Interests: A Consideration of
Absolute Bans on Sexual Minority Adoption From the Perspective of the Unadopted
Child (forthcoming 1996); Nancy D. Pollikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Rede-
fining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontradi-
tional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459 (1990).
19. Professor Reva Siegel provided this insight during a "workshop" on this paper in
her critical race theory course at Yale Law School.
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of technology as both constitutive of boundaries and as a means of
exploring beyond existing boundaries. So the introduction of new
technology may signal the opportunity to see life beyond existing
boundaries. In this respect, the microscope, space exploration, and
procreative technology may be alike.2
0
Even while technology represents the opportunity to explore the
unknown, we also take it as evidence of mastery-over nature, over
human weakness.21 Most of the procreative technologies at issue were
first developed for use in animal husbandry. The early work on ani-
mals enabled fairly quick successes when the technologies were first
applied to humans. So, in appearance, advances in procreative tech-
nology use on humans have come very quickly.22 The use of these
technologies has also occurred during a period in which scientists have
made very rapid progress in sequencing the genome and developing
applications for the knowledge. There is a resulting sense that scien-
tists are achieving mastery over the formulation of human life.23 So
the implication may be, if we can invent humans, we can certainly
invent family.
We understand technology to be something that humans invent.
Procreative technology use blurs the line implicit in that understand-
ing of technology-the line between human and technology.24 We
also, as suggested above, take for granted that we have technology to
20. A comparison to science fiction may also be useful. Like science fiction, our "real
world" understanding of technology "rests upon a scientific epistemology, one which as-
sumes, first and foremost, that the external world is both real and phenomenal. That is, it
consists in discrete, physical events that are available to us through our senses and that can
be recorded as facts." CARL D. MALMGREN, WORLDS APART: NARRATOLOGY OF Sci-
ENCE FICTION 4-5 (1991). Within a typology of science fiction, the narrative about procrea-
tive technology use fits into the category of "gadget science fiction." Id. at 101-19. Writers
of gadget science fiction "did not question the basic value of technology. They saw that
technology would bring big troubles ... but they were secure in the belief that more mas-
sive, more organised, doses of technology would take care of the problem." IL at 104
(quoting BRIAN ALDISS, BILLION YEAR SPREE: THE TRUE HISTORY OF SCIENCE FICTION
182 (1973)).
21. For a proposal of an alternative mode of knowledge-seeking not structured by
dualisms--culture vs. nature, rational mind vs. prerational body, objectivity vs. subjectivity,
etc.-that underlie the claim of mastery, see SANDRA HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION
iN FEmImm 136-62 (1986) (suggesting a move from empiricism to feminist standpoint
epistemologies).
22. But see infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
23. Longino, supra note 3, at 196.
24. Alexandra Chasin, Class and Its Close Relations: Identities Among Women, Ser-
vants, and Machines, in Pos7=mAN BoDIEs, supra note 2, at 73 (analyzing the persistent
assumption that there is a clear and stable ontological difference between humans and
technology).
better the world and to improve nature, whether nature be human,
environmental, or other. At the same time, we use the concept of
"unnatural" to signal when technology has gone too far. The question
of who should be the parents has tripped that signal.
There was a moment of great unease in December 1993 and Janu-
ary 1994, when three particular procreative technology uses triggered
widespread public debate and public appeals for legal regulation. Ital-
ian doctors used egg donation and in vitro fertilization to enable a 59-
year old British woman to have twins; British and Italian doctors im-
planted the ova of white women into black women; and British re-
searchers developed a technique to retrieve eggs from aborted mouse
fetuses to achieve fertility in other mice. The media reports often
combined the three events together to raise the issue of legal regula-
tion.2 5 The claim was that technology had gone too far. However, it is
not sufficient to say that these uses were controversial because they
push the boundaries of use. The issue is what boundaries do these
uses push.
The way these stories were combined with each other may be tell-
ing. Most of the news media stories that did not address all three uses
paired the post-menopausal woman having children with the black
women using white eggs. A few paired the post-menopausal women
having children with the possibility of retrieving fetal ova. Most of the
stories that focused only on one practice discussed post-menopausal
women having children. The obvious attention given to post-meno-
pausal pregnancy largely occurred because bans in England, France
and Italy were proposed when Italian doctors announced that a 59-
year old British woman had given birth to twins.26 In addition, promi-
nent officials in England strongly condemned the practice,2 7 as did the
25. See, e.g., CNN News International: Reproductive Technologies Raise Tough Ethi-
cal Questions (CNN television broadcast, Jan. 4, 1994) (transcript available in LEXIS,
News Library, CNN File). "These newest revelations [the possibility of using eggs from
aborted fetuses] come one week after fertility technology allowed a 59-year-old woman to
give birth to twins, and after Italian experts revealed they had implanted the egg of a white
woman into the womb of a black African who said a white child would have a 'better
chance' in life. Suddenly, science is moving faster than ethics can keep up." Id. (statement
by Vicki Barker, CNN Correspondent).
26. Jeremy Laurance, Fertility Treatment Rules May be Tightened After Woman, 59,
Has Twins, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 29, 1993, at 9.
27. Dr. John Marks, former chair of the British Medical Association, said that the
development "bordered on the Frankenstein syndrome." Simon Jenkins, Simon Jenkins of
The Times gives his view, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 2, 1994, at 8. Dr. Stuart
Homer of the British Medical Association's ethics committee condemned the practice on
the basis that the children will have parents of a "wholly foreign generation." Id.
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Vatican. 28 The other rule being considered was a British ban on
human research that would follow up on the retrieval of fetal ova in
mice.29 So what purposes did the black woman, white egg story serve?
The media reports of post-menopausal pregnancy included the
terms "granny moms" and "retirement pregnancies" in their accounts
of public debate. A few of the reports that paired "granny moms"
with black women using ova retrieved from white woman linked the
two practices and raised a concern about "designer babies." For ex-
ample, a Los Angeles Times article reported, "French officials said the
government was particularly alarmed by advances in medical technol-
ogy that now make it feasible for women to choose the ethnic identity,
physical size or other characteristics of their baby through embryo im-
plants.13 0 Post menopausal pregnancy requires ova donation, so the
opportunity for selection of race and other characteristics is created
by the process. But artificial insemination by donor creates the same
opportunity, and none of the stories mentioned artificial insemination
by donor. In fact, there has been little public or media attention to
trait selection in artificial insemination. So the concern seems to come
from the particular practices at issue in the media accounts and, more
specifically, the racial selection made visible in these stories.
The story of black women choosing white ova presents proof that
racial selection occurs.31 In truth, the other types of selection provokeminimal unease. Many people probably assume that those using arti-
ficial insemination have chosen donors for intellectual qualities, medi-
cal history, and physical qualities such as height, eye color, and hair
color that differ from their own. Those choices seem reasonable or at
least uncontroversial. It may also be that, given common knowledge
of basic genetics as well as the availability of tinted contact lenses, hair
coloring, and varying heel heights, we perceive these traits as mutable.
28. Philip Willan, Vatican Expert Condemns Mother of Test-Tube Twins, THE TIMEs,
Dec. 29, 1993, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database.
29. The ban was announced on January 4, 1994. Britain Rules Out "Womb-Robbing"
Fertility Treatment, Reuters, Jan. 4, 1994 (Reuters Library Report).
30. William Drozdiak, France Seeks Ban on Artificial Impregnation of Older Women,
L.A. TrAms, Jan. 4, 1994, at A12.
31. A 1995 story attracted a great deal of attention because the couple using in vitro
fertilization had twins, one white and one black. Here, the couple had chosen to use the
woman's ova and her spouse's sperm. The conception of a biracial child resulted not from
choice, but from a mistake made at the laboratory. See, Marlise Simons, Twins Touch Off
In-Vitro Debate; Clinic Admits Error After Mother Delivers Sons of Different Races, DAL-
LAS MORNING NEWS, June 28, 1995, at IA. The similarity between this story and the black
woman, white egg story, is that the unease arises from the transgression of the racial
boundary.
It is race that presents the problem. In fact, what is interesting is that
to the extent we assume that those using artificial insemination choose
donors of the same race as themselves, we do not think of racial selec-
tion. It is only when the choice crosses the color line that we call it a
choice, and identify that choice as troubling. Despite common knowl-
edge of basic genetics and despite our apparent embrace of color-
blindness as a legal standard and social norm, we still see race as im-
mutable. So it is not only the fact that a selection has been made, but
also that the selection signifies the mutability of race that provokes
the unease.
Most of the media reports that paired granny moms with black
women using white ova did explain the issues raised by postme-
nopausal pregnancy and motherhood, but did not explain the issues
raised by transracial ova donation. Critics worried that older women
would not live long enough, have enough energy, or be motherly (as
opposed to grandmotherly) enough.32 A few worried about the health
effects of pregnancy and childbirth on women past their naturally oc-
curring childbearing years. On the other hand, the problems raised by
the paired story were not made explicit; they were presumably self-
evident. Most of these stories provided only the race of the women,
and no other information. A few of the stories explained that few
black women donate ova. Fewer indicated that the British woman's
spouse was biracial, and that his sperm was used to fertilize the egg.
In absence of this information, however, the stories focused solely on
the woman's racial identity.
As mentioned, the legal rules at issue in these stories were pro-
posals to ban fertility treatment for postmenopausal women. The in-
clusion of the black woman, white egg story served to demonstrate the
urgency of the need to regulate procreative technology use. The fol-
lowing two excerpts from newspaper articles illustrate this point.
"The debate over engineering births expanded Friday with reports out
of Italy that a black mother gave birth after being impregnated with
an egg from a white woman. '33 "The debate has been fuelled by the
32. See, e.g., William E. Schmidt, Birth to 59-Yr-Old Briton Raises Ethical Storm, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 29, 1993, at Al ("Most of the objections are ethical ones, based on the strong
belief that it is best for a child to have active, able parents."); Bonnie Miller Rubin, New
Moms in 40s and 50s Give Birth to Questions Too, Ci. TRIB., Jan. 3, 1994, at N1 ("One
Chicago attorney, whose father was 60 when he was born, agreed [with Margie Rosen-
baum, 45, mother of 3, who said, [t]here is a point when it becomes unfair]. 'There were
times when it was painful,' he said. 'People always asked me if he was my grandfather."').
33. Post-Menopausal Pregnancies Called Basic Right of Women, ST. Louis PosT-Dis-
PATCH, Jan. 1, 1994, at 5B.
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implanting of white woman's egg into a black woman."' 4 In these
stories, race, or more specifically, some sort of racial transgression, is
the thing that proves that science has gone too far. Once again, the
immutability of race marks the desirable line between the natural and
unnatural. In plain terms,,the outrage expressed at the black woman,
white egg story indicates that assumptions about the desirability of
racial purity underlay procreative technology use.
The idea of a black woman having a white child oversteps lines
originally maintained by two mechanisms of racial subordination.
Both of these mechanisms were aimed directly at black women. Dur-
ing and after slavery, black women have cared for white children. But
they have done so as slaves or hired caretakers. 35 Parenthood con-
notes legal control, authority, even ownership. The image of a black
woman claiming authority over a white child inverts racially-based
rules of status and ownership. Second, the historical rule of race is
that any child born of a black woman is also black.3 6 The use of trans-
racial egg donation to change the conclusion that blackness begets
blackness challenges the assumption that black mothers create the
traits deemed inferior by white supremacy.
What may be most disturbing about this procreative technology
use is the imagined moment of a black woman giving birth to a white
infant, or a white woman giving birth to a black infant. Blackness has
been so othered that the intimacy, the ultimate intimacy, of the mo-
ment seems impossible and strange and perhaps even alien. The
strangeness and seeming impossibility of the image only shows the ex-
tent to which motherhood has been used to maintain the color line.
The level of unease generated by interracial birth may also indicate
that the notion of race that assumes biologically-inherent difference is
still deeply embedded in the more recent notion that racial difference
is culturally constructed.37
34. French to Ban "Granny Mums," PRss ASSOCIATION NEwsFrE,, Jan. 3, 1994
(Reuter newswire service).
35. See Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Cleaning Up/Kept Down: A Historical Perspective on
Racial Inequality in "Women's Work", 43 STAN. L. REv. 1333, 1339-42 (1991); see also
PATRICIA HIL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGMiT 70-78 (1990) (critiquing maternal
and sexualized images used to define black women as the other).
36. In part, this resulted from anti-miscegenation laws, so that black women who gave
birth to children fathered by white men were unmarried and the only parent (and hence,
the only race) associated with the child. This rule of race is also known as that of "hy-
podescent," under which "the offspring of a Black and a white is Black." See Neil Go-
tanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 24 (1991).
37. Id. at 3.
The media accounts of unease that paired the granny moms with
fetal oval retrieval were linked by the fact that fertility treatment of
women whose ova have deteriorated from age generates the need for
ova from other women. The media frequently reported use of the
term, "womb-robbing," for fetal ova retrieval.38 So, the pairing of
these two stories may have implied an association between the granny
moms and the womb robbers that echoes Little Red Riding Hood.
The troubling choice in the "womb robbing" stories was that of abor-
tion. Since the ova would be retrieved from aborted fetuses, the con-
cern was that the practice would encourage some women to choose
abortion. It is interesting that at some point, the public expression of
unease was framed as a problem of choice-whether postmenopausal
women should be able to choose to become pregnant; whether a black
women should be able to choose to become pregnant using a white
egg; and whether women should be able to choose abortion.
It seems to me that each of these stories were linked by a practice
that public discourse barely mentioned-egg donation. Curiously,
stories expressing doubts about the practice of "egg donation" did not
emerge until late 1995 and early 1996. 39 During the past year, media
stories and public attention have tended to focus on egg donation or
retrieval of eggs from young women for use by older women to
achieve pregnancy, and two other stories-the June 1995 scandal cre-
ated by allegations that physicians at the prestigious University of Cal-
ifornia, Irvine fertility clinic, had transferred ova and embryos without
the consent of the patients, and the story of the low success rates and
high costs of procreative technology use as infertility treatment. It
may be too soon to tell whether the concerns raised by these practices
will endure.
Of the three issues, only the U.C. Irvine scandal seems to have
generated a great deal of attention. The resulting calls for legal action
mostly have been expressed as the goal of finding out what went
wrong at this particular clinic and with these particular doctors. The
other two stories are more like those that have generated moments of
unease. They suggest that technology may have exceeded some ap-
propriate boundary. Typically, both the egg donation and low success-
38. Other terms included "fetus farming" and "grave-robbing." See, e.g., William
Tuohy, Using Aborted Fetuses' Eggs Spurs Controversy in Britain, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan.
3, 1994, at A7.
39. See, e.g., Jan Hoffman, Egg Donations Meet a Need and Raise Ethical Questions,
N.Y. Tirvms, Jan. 8, 1996, at Al. Some of these stories followed the allegations that doctors
at the University of California fertility clinic had given away eggs and embryos without the
patients' permission, while others preceded the publicity attending the investigation.
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high cost stories have asked whether the participants in procreative
technology are being exploited. For example, news articles about egg
donation have asked, "whether donors are victimized, whether clinics
give recipients truthful information about the donors, whether the
whole process has become too commercial."40 Articles about the
costs, risks, and success rates ask whether regulation is needed:
The scientific basis of high-tech treatments remains weak, and
clinical evidence that new techniques are significantly better than
old ones is scarce. But the strongest impetus for the reassessment
has been one little number. In 1993, the 267 clinics reporting to the
American Society for Reproductive Medicine started 41,209 as-
sisted-reproduction procedures. Of these, 8,741 resulted in live
births. That's a success rate of 21.2 percent.41
So the risk of exploitation is not sufficient to generate a moment of
unease. Supporters of the industry have an easy answer to these con-
cerns that bounces back at us, once again, from the abortion debate-
it's their choice.
To me, the practice of "egg donation" is cause for great unease.
Egg donation and fetal ova retrieval seem paired to me. They both
seem premised on an image of woman as disembodied, futureless, and
without agency. I am not speaking of the women who actually donate
eggs, but the image of woman that I think must animate these prac-
tices. In this image, the woman as a person has largely been erased.
This type of erasure has a long history, and I fear, a substantial future.
Yet this practice seems to have generated the lowest level of unease.
The primacy of fear about commercial exploitation over fear about
the erasure of the moral identity of woman reveals how dominant
standards for concreteness and tangibility operate on lines of gender,
race and other forms of marginalization. The concreteness and real-
ness we accord to cost and data but not to identity parallels the effects
of using the public/private distinction to regulate harms.42 To the ex-
tent that harms cannot be measured in terms of cost and data, those
harms will go unacknowledged and unaddressed.
The moments of unease reveal at least two tensions. One is be-
tween what we understand as the human and, in contrast, the human
40. Id.
41. Sharon Begley, The Baby Myth, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 4, 1995, at 38, 40.
42. For analysis and debate about how the public/private distinction is used to pre-
serve some aspects of family life, and thus the harms occurring there, as private and not
subject to intervention, see MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER,
SSExuAL FAMIy AND OTHER TwENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 177-98 (1995); Fran-
ces Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction, 10
CONST. COMmENTARY 319 (1993).
invention or technology. As suggested, procreative technology use
challenges the distinction implicit in the definition of technology. The
second is the tension between the natural and the unnatural. While
the promise of technology suggests that we can reinvent ourselves,
much of the unease arising from procreative technology use seems to
arise from the way the uses push boundaries we call natural. These
two pairs of tension are not mutually exclusive. Accordingly, I focus
on tensions as well as dichotomies in mapping the webbed, nonlinear
discourses of in/fertility. I use these points of tension to investigate
the boundaries of procreative technology use and the identity bounda-
ries drawn in the in/fertility discourses.
The contradictions within the in/fertility discourses reveal that
our understanding of the natural within these discourses is contingent,
and that the contingencies have to do with race and gender, at least.
The permeability of the human/technology distinction suggests not
simply that our understanding of what it means to be human is con-
structed or invented, but that some human identities are purposefully
more invention than others. More specifically, the stories and images
of the infertile within these discourses make the embodiment of infer-
tile woman an inbetween, a wedge that operates to maintain race,
class and sexual orientation boundaries. The embodiment of infertile
woman is not a reified body.43 The embodiment is fluid and interac-
tive with those on the fringe or far side of the boundaries. The core of
this wedge is gender. The non-moments of unease, like that of egg
donation, indicate that much of what we make of women in these dis-
courses consists of erasure.
II. Boundaries of Use
As I said in the opening paragraph, procreative technology is
nearly indistinguishable from the stories about its uses. In medical,
informational media, and popular entertainment accounts, procreative
technology is usually applied because of infertility. Stories about in-
fertility have become part and parcel of most discussions about pro-
creative technology, and vice versa. What I want to explore here is
the contradictory power of procreative technology as infertility
treatment.
43. Donna Harraway, Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the
Privilege of Partial Perspective, in TECHNOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE, supra
note 3, at 185 ("Feminist embodiment, then, is not about fixed location in a reified body,
female or otherwise, but about nodes in fields, inflections in orientations, and responsibil-
ity for difference in material-semiotic fields of meaning.").
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A. The Possibilities of Procreative Technology
If Louise Brown's birth was a critical moment, it is largely be-
cause we read three sets of significant possibilities into that moment.44
One set of possibilities was expressed in the question of who should
be the parents-the possibility of reformulating family. The second
set of possibilities were voiced softly, but negatively. These were the
questions about the moral significance of separating conception from
pregnancy and the dehumanization suggested by the image of "test-
tube babies." The third set arises from the characterization of procre-
ative technology as infertility treatment. In fact, Naomi Pfeffer marks
1978 as the year "[i]nvoluntary infertility resurfaced as a live issue."45
It is not that procreative technology created these possibilities,
but that these possibilities suddenly seemed feasible, serious, and real.
Nor is the point that these three sets of possibilities were necessarily
mutually exclusive. But in the moments to follow, procreative tech-
nology was characterized first and foremost as infertility treatment.
That characterization contains a contradiction of the possibility of us-
ing the technology to reformulate family. The use of procreative tech-
nology to reinscribe a particular model of family has swept aside the
second set of possibilities46-the questions about whether the technol-
ogy use changes what it means to be human-by placing the use in a
traditional setting, and thus "naturalizing" it.
We cannot take the fact that infertility treatment has ascended as
the primary explanation for procreative technology as the result of
either chance or simple utility. That fact signals something about the
other possibilities we read into Louise Brown's birth. Perhaps this is
stating the obvious, but the possibility of reformulating the family has
created moral uncertainty and anxiety. The very possibility challenges
44. Sarah Franklin, Postmodern Procreation: A Cultural Account of Assisted Repro-
duction, in CONCErVING THE NE W WoRLD ORDER, supra note 2, at 323 (writing that,
"[f]rom an anthropological perspective, this conception story is an overdetermined one.
With the birth of Louise Brown also came into being a new kind of public debate about
conception, in which unprecedented procreative possibilities raised moral uncertainty and
political controversy."). Compare a recent overview article published in a medical journal,
which opens by noting the birth of Louise Brown in 1978, and concludes by paying tribute
to the "improved chances of success to achieve parenthood for couples seeking infertility
treatment." Kamran S. Moghissi & Richard Leach, Future Directions in Reproductive
Medicine, 116 ARcmvEs OF PATHOLOGY & LABORATORY MEDICINE 436,441 (1992).
45. PVFFER, supra note 10, at 27.
46. Another consequence of sweeping aside the questions about the effect of this
technology use on our understanding of what is human is to further marginalize the ques-
tion of whether we should use the technology.
something that seemed fundamental. What is that fundamental some-
thing threatened by the possibility of reformulating family?
Thoughtful commentators have leaned toward two particular con-
cerns about the possibilities of reformulating family. One is the intel-
lectual and moral confusion that might result from separating
different aspects of the biological relationship between parent and
child. More specifically, the concern has been that the separation of
coital conception, genetic ties, gestation, and child rearing means that
we have to articulate why these connections are significant and we
have to weight these connections. There is the chance that in the pro-
cess we will have to admit that some or all of these connections are
not significant. That admission would undermine our existing justifi-
cations for protecting the relationships we have been calling "family."
It might threaten or at least devalue the psychic significance we attri-
bute to these connections. Or, there is the chance that we will lose
something simply by exposing the connections to questioning. The
second concern raised about the possibility of reformulating family is
for the welfare of children born as a result of procreative technology
use. This concern has focused on the psychological risk that might
come to a child from learning the means of birth, and from physical
defects that may be caused by the intervention of technology.4 7
Consider how these concerns have been discussed in the context
of two surrogacy cases, In re Baby M 48 and Johnson v. Calvert.49 Both
cases were highly publicized. Anthropologist Helena Ragone con-
cluded in her ethnography of surrogacy that the judicial decisions in
the Baby M case reflected public opinion.50 I would extend that ob-
servation to the Johnson case as well. The outcomes in both cases
have been explained as similar resolutions of the concerns about iden-
tifying the significant biological connections and the welfare of the
child. For these reasons, these cases can serve as an introductory text
for exploring the nature of the fundamental something at issue in the
possibility of reformulating family.51
47. See, e.g., Cynthia B. Cohen, Give Me Children or I Shall Die: New Reproductive
Technologies and Harm to Children, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 19 (Mar.-Apr. 1996); Eli-
sabeth Rosenthal, From Lives Begun in the Lab, Brave New Joy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1996,
at Al.
48. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
49. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
50. HELENA RAGONE, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: CONCEPTION IN THE HEART 2
(1994).
51. See also Adria Schwartz, Taking the Nature Out of Mother, in REPRESENTATIONS
OF MOTHERHOOD 240 (Donna Bassin et al. eds., 1994). Ms. Schwartz, a psychoanalyst,
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In the Baby M case, Marybeth Whitehead entered into an agree-
ment with Elizabeth and William Stem. Ms. Whitehead was artifi-
dally inseminated with Mr. Stem's semen, became pregnant, and gave
birth to a child. She then refused to relinquish her parental fights so
that Ms. Stem could adopt the child.5 2 The New Jersey Supreme
Court refused to recognize the surrogacy contract and sever the legal
relationship between Ms. Whitehead and the child. Using the best
interests of the child standard, the court awarded custody to Mr.
Stem, and then remanded the issue of Mrs. Whitehead's visitation
rights to the trial court. Ms. Stem was not allowed to adopt the
child.5 3 The Court thus affirmed the biological connections present in
this case as the basis for the parent-child relationship. In addition, the
opinion accords the welfare of the child as primary among the policy
concerns. Among its concerns, the court mentioned the harm that
might occur when a child learned that the parties to the contract had
bought and sold the parental rights.54
In Johnson v. Calvert, Anna Johnson entered a surrogacy agree-
ment with Crispina and Mark Calvert. In vitro fertilization using Cris-
pina Calvert's ova and Mark Calvert's sperm was performed. A
physician placed a pre-embryo in Ms. Johnson, who became pregnant
and gave birth to the child. She then refused to relinquish her claim to
parental rights.55 Two differences between this case and Baby M
proved to be key. In Baby M, all the parties were white. 56 In Johnson
v. Calvert, the three adults were all of different races. Anna Johnson
is African American. Crispina Calvert is Filipina. And Mark Calvert
is white. The media stories focused on Anna Johnson's blackness and
Mark Calvert's whiteness. 5 7 In these stories, the baby was not de-
highlights "the inadequacy of the essentialist-social constructionist polarity as a vehicle for
analysis" by examining Baby M and Margaret Atwood's The Handmaid's Tale. Id. at 241.
52. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1235-37 (N.J. 1988).
53. Id. at 1240 (contract), 1258 (custody), 1261 (visitation).
54. Id. at 1250 ("The long-term effects of surrogacy contracts are not known, but
feared-the impact on the child who learns her life was bought, that she is the offspring of
someone who gave birth to her only to obtain money.").
55. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993).
56. See photographs in Lori B. Andrews, 'Baby M'-Part 2, 73 A.B.A. J. 30 (Dec.
1987). While the photographs do not prove the parties to the surrogacy contract in Baby
M. are white, the lack of media commentary about race compared to the consistent com-
mentary about the race of the parties to the contract in issue in Johnson v. Calvert strongly
suggests that William Stern, Elizabeth Stern, and Marybeth Whitehead are all white.
57. For photographs and commentary highlighting the race of the parties, see Seth
Mydans, Science and the Courts Take a New Look at Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11,
1990, at E6; Don J. DeBenedictis, Surrogacy Contract Enforced, 77 A.B.A. J. 32-33 (Jan.
1991); Martin Kasindorf, And Baby Makes Four, L.A. TIMEs MAG., Jan. 20, 1991, at 10-11.
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scribed as biracial or Filipino, but was implicitly made white. Like the
1994 stories reporting that a black woman had used a white woman's
ova, the stories about Johnson v. Calvert did not explain the difference
race might make. It was apparently self-explanatory. And as in 1994,
race did make a difference; there was unease over the idea of a black
woman claiming a "white" child. The California Supreme Court did
not mention race in its opinion. The Court recognized the Calverts as
the legal parents, thus denying Anna Johnson any legal basis for cus-
tody or visitation. The Court's analysis rested on the genetic connec-
tion between the Calverts and the child. The message that follows
from this holding is that the genetic link is superior to the biological
connection formed by pregnancy and childbirth. In the public discus-
sion about the case, the racial identities of the parties made the logic
of the preference for genetic link obvious.
In both of these cases, there was never any question that William
Stern and Mark Calvert would be recognized as the legal fathers. Nor
was their desire for a genetically-related child questioned. The parent
question at issue in both cases was, who should be the mother and
whose motivation was most appropriate. The fact is that the law in
most states protects the parental status of the genetic father except
where artificial insemination by anonymous donor has been used.58
There is also well-established law that presumes that a woman who
gives birth to a child is that child's legal mother.59 The California
Supreme Court's decision indicates that the legal status of women as
mothers is less well-established and more contingent than that of men
as fathers.
A reading of the surrogacy cases, Johnson v. Calvert in particular,
in light of the history behind the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA)
reveals the role of race in the contingent nature of motherhood. We
rarely think about the legal basis for motherhood. The fact that a wo-
man gives birth to a child makes the woman's status as mother seem
obvious. Yet, the rule that the woman who gives birth to a child is the
legal mother has long depended on the woman's race.60 For example,
the maternal presumption was simply not applied to women who were
slaves.61 These black women had no legal claim to their children.
Professor Mary Louise Fellows has shown how the maternal presump-
58. See, e.g., CAL. FAMILY CODE § 7611, § 7613 (West 1996).
59. See, e.g., CAL. FAMILY CODE § 7610 (West 1996).
60. Mary Louise Fellows, The Law of Legitimacy: An Instrument of Procreative
Power, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 495, 500-01 (1993).
61. Id. at 504.
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tion and its exceptions result from patriarchal concerns about sexual
control of women and racial purity.62 The holding of Johnson v. Cal-
vert has created another exception to the maternal presumption. The
Court's preference for the genetic, rather than the experiential basis
for parenthood is historically located in the twin goals of racial purity
and the sexual control of women. The fact that Anna Johnson is black
makes that history visible. The fact that so many find logic in the
holding suggests that the goals are not mere relics.
Professor Fellows has also illustrated how the marital presump-
tion-an evidentiary presumption that a child born to a married wo-
man is the child of the husband-operates to "transfer procreative
power to white men while simultaneously minimizing and denying the
procreative power of African-American women and, in different ways,
of white women."63 In part, the presumption was created on the
premise that interracial marriage was forbidden. So, the rule was
never applied to white men in relationships with black women.64 Fur-
ther, the rule was not applied to married white women who gave birth
to children that appeared to be of mixed race.65 In other words, the
law was intended to secure paternity rights to white children.66 When
the presumption was used in an interracial marriage context, the
courts often refused to apply the pre-UPA marital presumption, espe-
cially if the result would be to recognize an African American child as
heir of a white father.67 One can read the Johnson case as continuing
the judicial practice of selectively applying the parental status laws to
maintain white fatherhood. In other words, the court's holding was
not inevitable. Our preference for genetic links has political as well as
sociobiological reasons. Here, a decision to recognize Ms. Johnson as
the child's legal mother would have given a black woman claim to a
white child, made the child nominally black, and would have estab-
lished a white man's paternity to that child.
Stating the last point in normative terms, motherhood is contin-
gent on white fatherhood in this line of paternity cases. Ms. Johnson's
62. Id. at 495.
63. Id. at 496. See also Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CH. L. REv. 209,
211 (1995) (revealing that the "genetic tie's precise social import depends on the type of
relationship to which it becomes relevant and the prevalent social conditions that influence
that relationship"). Professor Roberts further demonstrates that race is significant in de-
termining the import of the genetic tie. Id-
64. Fellows, supra note 60, at 504.
65. Id. at 501-02.
66. Professor Fellows shows that what emerges from the UPA as most protected is the
relationship between the white husband and the white child. Id at 532.
67. Id. at 503.
role was reduced to that of biological function. From a feminist stand-
point, the preference for the genetic link, rather than that formed by
pregnancy and childbirth, is perfectly consistent with a male-centered
perspective. In simplistic terms, recognizing or even preferring preg-
nancy and childbirth as a legally significant basis for establishing
parenthood would diminish the power of men as fathers; but prefer-
ring the genetic link while devaluing pregnancy and childbirth subor-
dinates women as mothers.68 The marital presumption cases did not
directly devalue pregnancy and childbirth. But they did reduce black
women to biological functionaries. These cases erased black woman's
status as wife and mother. Motherhood assumes fatherhood. But in
these cases, black women merely produced black, not white, children,
who could not lay claim to their white fathers.
The concerns about the welfare of the child and biological inde-
terminacy have been addressed within the public discourses, at least
with respect to surrogacy. First, the UPA, in contradiction to its effect,
has the avowed purpose of protecting the welfare of the child.69
Neither the judicial nor public opinions suggested that the outcomes
of the surrogacy cases undermined this purpose. Second, procreative
technology use has extended the primacy of genetics as the basis for
parenthood, and fatherhood in particular. The match between the
legal outcome and public opinion in these cases may reflect the social
significance attributed to the genetic connection. The significance of
that connection seems "natural." But history shows that the signifi-
cance attributed to genetic links comes from patriarchy and white
supremacy. The naturalness of the relationship at issue depends on
the race of the parents, and in particular on the race of the mother. In
the marital presumption cases, the father-child relationship seemed
unnatural because the marital relationship seemed unnatural; the
marital relationship seemed unnatural because the woman married to
the white man was African American. In Johnson v. Calvert, the par-
ent (Anna Johnson)-child relationship seemed unnatural-unnatural
because the woman who gave birth to the white child was black. One
could state the explanations in reverse racial order. That is, one could
say that the father-child relationship in the marital presumption cases
seemed unnatural because the father was white, or that the parent-
child relationship in Johnson v. Calvert seemed unnatural because the
68. See also ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 40-47 (offering a critique of the law's empha-
sis on the genetic tie over the experience of nurturing, and the effect of that emphasis in
Baby M).
69. Fellows, supra note 60, at 522.
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child was white. But the fact that the law secured the status of the
fathers so that neither William Stern nor Mark Calvert had to defend
their paternity shifted the focus to the identity of the mothers.
The uncertainty raised by the possibilities of reformulating family
now may be read more accurately as concern about maintaining the
security of paternity, particularly for white fathers. The anxiety about
using procreative technology to produce new family structures also
may have been a more general concern about maintaining the primacy
of the "nuclear" or marriage-based family as the most privileged fam-
ily structure. That concern also explains why procreative technology
as infertility treatment emerged as the primary explanation for its use.
As infertility treatment, procreative technology use has become a way
of reinscribing the marriage-based family on the middle class.
B. The Technological Reinscription of the Marriage-based Family on the
Middle Class
The institutional authority of both medicine and law have been
brought to bear on the technological reinscription of the marriage-
based family. Within the in/fertility discourses, the normative power
of "family" naturalizes the technology, while the excluding power of
"family" marks non-marriage-based parent-child relationships as
unnatural.
Consider the formal definition of "infertility." It usually states
that a couple is infertile if conception has not occurred after one year
of unprotected intercourse. The meaning of these words is clear if you
read into them dominant assumptions about who should have chil-
dren. In other words, the definition assumes that the couple is hetero-
sexual. It assumes that they have failed to conceive after a particular
type of intercourse-vaginal penetration by the penis, followed by
ejaculation. My point about the patriarchal and heterosexist assump-
tions built into the definition of infertility may seem overwrought.
But the effects of the assumptions are real. When we read heterosex-
uality into the definition of infertility, it becomes impossible for a non-
partnered person or lesbian couple to be included among the infertile.
Since procreative technology use is primarily understood as infertility
treatment, access to the technology usually hinges on the diagnostic
power of the definition.
The process of choosing criteria for diagnosis requires designating
some experience as more significant than others. That ability to de-
fine standards then becomes the power to test. Foucault described the
power to test as "normalizing," as that which "introduces the con-
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straints of conformity... [that] compares, differentiates, hierarchizes,
homogenizes, excludes. ' 70 Here, testing is a means of reinforcing the
norms expressed in the test itself. Medicine has used its power to test
in ways that reinforce traditional, excluding norms that privilege het-
erosexual marriage as the basis for family formation. Testing, in this
context, is a sign of fitness for parenthood. The contents of the defini-
tion deem some not fit for testing nor, by implication, for parenthood.
At fertility clinics, physicians often screen by using fixed social
criteria. Marital status, age, and sexual orientation are commonly
used to exclude unmarried persons, especially lesbians and gay men,
from procreative technology use.71 Professor Helena Ragone lists
these criteria as "extra-program guidelines" for surrogacy programs:
"(1) Couples should be asked to provide medical proof of their infer-
tility; (2) Only heterosexual, married couples should be permitted the
option of participating in the surrogate mother program; (3) Unmar-
ried heterosexual women or men should not be permitted to engage
the services of a surrogate; (4) Lesbians, lesbian couples, gay men, or
gay male couples should not be permitted to engage the services of a
surrogate. '72 She defines extra-program guidelines as those "primar-
ily designed as a public relations strategy, to protect the industry from
potential negative publicity by averting situations that might be per-
ceived as immoral, exploitative, or transgressive. ' '73  Two obvious
points follow from this. First, medicine and the fertility industry is
consciously accepting dominant norms about preferred family struc-
tures, or at least medicine is consciously reconstructing what it per-
ceives to be acceptable. Second, the guidelines make clear that non-
marriage based family formation is understood to be transgressive.
So "infertile" married couples are safely within the boundaries of
use. Medical literature, popular culture accounts, and legal scholar-
ship tend to affirm the need to provide such treatment to married
couples.74 In fact, most of the accounts that characterize procreative
technology as infertility treatment simply assume that married couples
70. MICHEL FOUCAuLT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 183-84 (1979).
71. See Sarah Franklin, Essentialism, Which Essentialism? Some Implications of Re-
productive and Genetic Techno-Science, 24 J. HOMOSEXUALrIY 27, 31-33 (1993) (illustrat-
ing that in England, heterosexual essentialism is preserved by government restricting the
use of new technologies to two-parent families consisting of both mother and father, so
that which should have resulted in the erosion of heterosexual privilege has, instead, led to
its reinforcement).
72. RAGONE, supra note 50, at 16.
73. Id. at 15.
74. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family, 47
HASTnNGS L.J. 911 (1996).
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are the patients. In commenting on law professor John Robertson's
book, Children of Choice,75 Dr. Howard Jones, a renowned expert on
procreative technology,76 expressly limits his discussion to "those pa-
tients who suffer from infertility. ' 77 In the discussion that follows, it
becomes clear that those patients are married women. He recom-
mends that doctors ask, "Why do you want a baby?" 78 He also evalu-
ates the answers he has heard. If the woman does not refer to her
spouse, the doctor's comments do. In other words, he supplies the
woman's marital status for the reader. He identifies one answer as
problematic because the woman spoke as "I." He notes, "[t]he infer-
tility specialist likes to hear 'WE.,,,79 Dr. Jones also chooses one an-
swer as the best one. The woman said, "My husband and I have a
very happy marriage, but have been distressed that we have not had a
child. I think we will make ideal parents. We hope the problem can
be solved." Dr. Jones added, "[n]otice that it is expressed in terms of
"we" rather than "I.80 Dr. Jones' preference for "we" does not ex-
press concern about the doctor-patient relationship, but about the
marital relationship.
Clinic rules that screen patients based on these social criteria re-
inforce the conflation of marriage, heterosexuality, and procreation.
This, in turn, makes each social category seem like an inherent ele-
ment of the others-marriage as heterosexual, heterosexuality as pro-
creative, and procreation as marital. The apparent inseparability of
these concepts makes the definition of infertility and the procreative
technology use as infertility treatment less penetrable to questioning.
The reservation of procreative technology for use by heterosexual,
married couples to achieve parenthood seems unquestionable and
therefore, natural.
75. JoHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOIcE: FREEDOM AND THE NEw REPRO-
DucrVE TrCHNOLOGMS (1994).
76. "Shortly after the birth of the world's first child conceived by IVY, Drs. Howard
and Georgeanna Jones of Norfolk, VA, initiated trials of IYE at Eastern Virginia Medical
School.... After several months of effort, Jones and colleagues were able to announce the
birth of the first IVF child in the United States. The Norfolk program continues to provide
invaluable leadership in the field, not only in the technical aspects of Assisted Reproduc-
tive Technologies, but also in the complicated ethical and social issues. The program estab-
lished by the Doctors Jones remains one of the largest and most successful in the United
States." Luther M. Talbert, The Assisted Reproductive Technologies: An Historical Over-
view, 116 ARcHIv:s oF PATHOLOGY & LABORATORY MEDicnm 320, 320 (1992).
77. Howard W. Jones, Jr., Children of Choice: A Doctor's Perspective, 52 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 225, 225 (1995).
78. Id. at 226-28.
79. Id. at 228.
80. Id.
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The class and race dimensions of the boundaries of use emerge in
the effects of the clinic rules. Current estimates of the mean charges
for in vitro fertilization range from $6,233 to $8,000,81 although one
study showed that, in 1992, charges at six centers ranged from $7,000
to $11,000.82 The cost per delivery may be $44,000 to $211,940.83
Anyone who uses in vitro fertilization or a comparable method must
have substantial credit or lots of cash. For many, the lack of financial
means bars access to procreative technology use. In effect, the high
cost screens out low income users. Surrogacy users "as a group are
upper-middle-income, educated professionals, in their late thirties and
early forties .... The average combined family income is in excess of
$100,000."84 In addition, the majority of couples who use surrogacy,85
in vitro fertilization, and other technologies8 6 to achieve fertility are
white.8 7 Procreative technology use has become a racially-specific,
class-based method of family formation.
Procreative technology use is little regulated at law. In other
words, the law enables physicians and clinic rules to operate freely.
So while there has been much public and scholarly discussion about
81. John A. Collins, A Couple with Infertility, 274 JAMA 1159, 1162 (1995); Peter J.
Neumann et al., The Cost of Successful Delivery with In Vitro Fertilization, 331 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 239 (1994).
82. Neumann, supra note 81, at 239-40.
83. Id. at 239; see also John A. Collins et al., An Estimate of the Cost of In Vitro
Fertilization Services in the United States in 1995, 64 FERTiLrrY & STERILrrY 538 (1995). A
significant amount of the cost accrues because multiple births are more common among
procreative technology users. Assisted-reproductive techniques were used in 2 percent of
singleton, 35 percent of twin, and 77 percent of higher-order multiple gestation
pregnancies. Tamara L. Callahan et al., The Economic Impact of Multiple-Gestation
Pregnancies and the Contribution of Assisted-Reproduction Techniques to Their Incidence,
331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 244, 247 (1994). Multiple births increase the costs of maternal care
and neonatal care. "[T]he total charge per family in 1991 was $9,845 for a 29-year old
white mother of a single neonate and her child, as compared with $37,947 for a mother of
twins and her two children and $109,765 for a mother of triplets and her three children."
Id
84. RAGONE, supra note 50, at 89-91.
85. Id. at 91.
86. Lynne S. Wilcox & William D. Mosher, Use of Infertility Services in the United
States, 82 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 122, 125 (1993); Elizabeth Heitman, Infertility as a
Public Health Problem: Why Assisted Reproductive Technologies Are Not the Answer, 6
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 89, 93-94 (1995).
87. A study of the costs of multiple-gestation pregnancies found that 35 percent of
twin and 77 percent of higher-order multiple-gestation pregnancies occurred after procrea-
tive technology use, and that "[w]omen with twin and higher-order multiple gestation
pregnancies were.., more likely to be white." Callahan, supra note 83, at 245. See Doro-
thy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 935, 937 (1996) (discuss-
ing the reasons for the racial disparity between African Americans and white Americans in
procreative technology use).
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using law to regulate procreative technology use, the standard ap-
proach has been to refrain from legal intervention, and in effect, to
delegate the regulatory function to medicine. To the extent that legal
rules do govern procreative technology use, most rules affirm current
medical industry practices.
Most of the existing legal rules govern use through the potential
parents, rather than through the medical professional. And the most
common types of legal rules provide legal certainty for married
couples who use procreative technology. More specifically, the most
common types of legal rules provide married couples with certainty
about their status as the legal parents and the status of the child as
theirs. In addition, the legal rules, like the clinic rules assume that the
potential parents are married couples. For example, approximately
one-third of the states have adopted the Uniform Parentage Act pro-
visions to determine the status of a child conceived by artificial insem-
ination.88 The UPA provides that a child born to a married woman by
heterologous artificial insemination is the husband's child, if he con-
sented in writing, and if a physician performed the insemination. It
further states that the donor in this situation is not the father.89 These
legal rules support the prevailing view that procreative technology is
medical treatment most appropriately used to address married
couples' infertility.
Few states provide rules that create legal certainty for unmarried
persons who use artificial insemination. In some states, a sperm donor
may establish paternity after the child's birth by having his name
placed on the birth certificate, by declaring paternity, and/or by prov-
ing genetic paternity. Only Arkansas, New Hampshire, and Washing-
ton allow a sperm donor to declare intent before a child's birth.90 So
88. Uniform Parentage Act §§ 5(a) & (b), 9B U.L.A. 287, 301-01 (1987). Approxi-
mately one quarter of the states have identical language. A few states have substantially
similar statutes that use language focusing on the child's legitimacy, or that declare the
child to be the "same as the naturally conceived child of the husband and wife." See, e.g.,
ALAsKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-771 (1994); IDAHO CODE § 39-
5405 (1995).
89. If a physician does not perform the insemination, the donor may or may not be
able to establish paternity. See In re Thomas S. v. Robin Y, 599 N.Y.S.2d 377, 382 (Fam.
Ct. 1993), rev'd on appeal, 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1994) (denying paternity of sperm donor
based on evidence that he lacked intent to claim paternity); C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821,
824-25 (NJ. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1977) (recognizing C.M. as the legal father based on the
parties expectations at the time of insemination); Jhordan C. v. Mary K, 244 Cal. Rptr. 530,
533-36 (Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing the sperm donor as the legal father because a physi-
cian had not performed the insemination).
90. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1995); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:l-
B:11 (1995); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26-26-050(2) (West 1995).
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only three states clearly enable unmarried couples or nonpartnered
men to plan parenthood through insemination without legal risk.
While nearly every state has a statute addressing some aspect of
artificial insemination use, fewer states govern at law the less accessi-
ble (due to cost and/or the need for medical expertise) types of pro-
creative technology. Only fourteen states and the District of Columbia
have enacted statutes addressing surrogacy. Of these jurisdictions,
four have enabling legislation. Florida expressly permits gestational
surrogacy agreements.91 The Nevada, New Hampshire, and Virginia
statutes permit surrogacy contracts in which the intended parents are
married and money is paid to the surrogate only for medical and nec-
essary living expenses for the birth of the child.92 Only one state,
Washington, does not require that the intended parents be married.
93
Arkansas is the one state that expressly provides for the possibility of
unmarried men (but not women) using surrogacy to become a par-
ent.94 The other eight states and the District of Columbia have stat-
utes that prohibit surrogate parenting contracts, declare them
unenforceable, or criminalize participation in commercial surrogacy.95
Only three states have enacted statutes that address the status or use
of cryopreserved pre-embryos. 96 The most recent form of law ad-
dressing procreative technology use requires insurance companies to
cover use of in vitro fertilization, embryo transfer, gamete intrafal-
lopian transfer, zygote intrafallopian transfer, or other technologies as
infertility treatment.97 Most of the states that have adopted this type
91. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15-742.16 (West 1995) ("gestational surrogacy" is defined
as "a commissioning couple's eggs or sperm, or both, are mixed in-vitro and the resulting
preembryo is implanted within another woman's body").
92. NEv. REv. STAT. § 126.045 (West 1995); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:1-168-
B:25 (West 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156-20.165 (West 1995).
93. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.210-26.26.260 (West 1995).
94. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1995).
95. 1995 D.C. STAT § 16-401 to 16-402; IND. CODE ANN. 31-8-1-1 to 31-8-2-3 (Bums
1994); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (West 1995); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713
(West 1991); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.851-722.863 (West 1995); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-21,200 (West 1995); N.Y. DOM. REL. §§ 121-125 (McKinney 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-18-05 (1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (1995).
96. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17; LA. REv. STAT. § 9:121-9:133; N. H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 168-13:1 to 168-B:15.
97. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. § 5/356m (Smith-Hurd 1995):
(a) No group policy of accident and health insurance providing coverage for more
than 25 employees that provides pregnancy related benefits may be issued,
amended, delivered, or renewed in this State ... unless the policy contains cover-
age for the diagnosis and treatment of infertility including, but not limited to in
vitro fertilization, uterine embryo lavage, embryo transfer, artificial insemination,
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of requirement limit coverage to married couples.98 Again, the ex-
isting legal rules tend to echo existing medical practices, which in turn,
operate on assumptions about "transgressive" family formation. The
fact that most states do not have legal rules addressing surrogacy
leaves doctors and clinics free to exercise the "power to test."
The success of characterizing procreative technology as infertility
treatment has marked the discourses of in/fertility in at least two ways.
First, the technological imperative has become a family formation im-
perative-at least for married couples, and perhaps also for single per-
sons who "should be" married (i.e. those presumed to be
heterosexual). The focus has shifted from the "unnatural" method of
family formation that procreative technology might represent to the
unnaturalness of childlessness. Second, because "infertility" has come
to mean a treatable, and therefore temporary condition, it stands in
opposition to "sterility." Sterility signals permanent inability to have
a child. Before the advent of infertility as a treatable condition, steril-
ity referred to physical flaws causing childlessness. Now sterility may
have a physical or social source. That is, sterility now includes those
whom I call the "dysfertile," those rendered childless by their failure
to fit the definition of infertile, because they are unmarried and/or
lesbian or gay. Within the discourse, sterility is an abnormal state.
Because having children is the natural state, and because the assump-
tion that childlessness is temporary has grown stronger, those who are
unmarried or married without children are seen as waiting to have
children, even expected to use the technology to achieve
parenthood. 99 Thus the technology imperative has been transformed
from a need to see scientific progress into a social imperative for
which it is natural to use technology to achieve.
C. High Tech-Low Tech Procreation
Consider the distinction the legal rules make between artificial
insemination on the one hand, and on the other, the methods of as-
sisted conception that require more expertise and more money. The
different legal treatment correlates with the designation of these tech-
nologies as low tech and high tech, respectively. Perhaps the first
gamete intrafallopian transfer, zygote intrafallopian tube transfer, and low tubal
ovum transfer.
98. See HAw. REv. STAT. § 431:10A-116.5 (1995); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 477EE
(1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-30 (1995).
99. The recent spate of self-help books for those who have decided to not have chil-
dren evidences the pressure brought to bear on women and opposite-sex couples to be-
come parents.
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thing to note is that in other contexts, the low-tech designation has
acquired a slightly negative connotation, whereas high-tech is pre-
sumptively both more sophisticated and more effective. The distinc-
tion may arise from that part of the technology imperative that
equates new technology with progress. It also serves the purpose of
marking the development of new technology. This works, of course,
because we also assume that new tech should be high tech. But what
particular significance does the high tech/low tech distinction acquire
in the in/fertility discourses?
I start from the pattern drawn by the legal rules. The fact that
many more states have regulated artificial insemination probably re-
sults, in part, from the fact that it was the method first used on
humans, it is the most commonly used method, and it is one of the
least controversial methods. So there has been more time and more
consensus to enact rules. In addition, artificial insemination by donor
sperm creates a paternity question. And, as mentioned, most of the
existing statutes address this very concern. Yet, the legal rules ad-
dressing artificial insemination express other concerns, as well. As
discussed, a majority of the statutes limit the goal of providing cer-
tainty regarding the status of the child and paternity to the context of
marriage. In addition, most of the statutes require that a physician
perform the insemination, despite the fact that insemination is a do-it-
yourself technology, either to trigger the status presumptions or to use
artificial insemination at all. The physician requirement may increase
medical safety. But it also identifies physicians as the official gate-
keepers of fertility. 100 Maintaining the authority of physicians rein-
forces the characterization of artificial insemination as medical
treatment, and vice versa. Finally, think about how the natural and
the technological change shape here. The imperative of family forma-
tion abetted by procreative technology as infertility treatment natural-
izes the technology use. But the requirement that physicians perform
even this simple procedure keeps the technology from becoming too
natural. Semen becomes a controlled substance, and hence something
artificial and manufactured.
The high tech/low tech distinction may not only arise from the
technology imperative, but may also shape it. Some have reported
that the publicity given to in vitro fertilization and other high tech
100. Since in vitro fertilization and the other high tech methods of achieving concep-
tion and pregnancy require expertise, a legal rule requiring physician participation is
unnecessary.
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methods have created a demand for those particular methods. 0 1 The
reported successes achieved from the high tech methods may cause
some infertile couples to discount the efficacy of the low tech meth-
ods. The high tech methods have acquired a life of their own. Of
course, that last point contains an internal contradiction. The fact that
the high-demand methods are high tech insures that they do not have
a life of their own, but that they stay within the control of medicine. 0 2
The low tech methods may suffer from being too easy and simple
in comparison to the high tech methods. The high tech methods are
for the serious problems. The high tech methods, therefore, result in
miracles. But the differentiation between high tech and low tech pro-
creation also speaks of who wields the technology, which also speaks
of whether that use is socially sanctioned. Those who perform the
high tech methods are special. "'If you are the messiah for a kind of
medical care, you'll have people beating your door down,' Dr. Ledger
said.' u0 3 Compare the implications of the label used for self-insemi-
nation: the turkey baster method. The label is humorous, but also
denigrating. It captures the negativity of the low tech designation by
implying crudeness. It subjects those who self-inseminate to ridicule.
101. See e.g., Nancy Wartik, Making Babies: The Boom in the Infertility Business is
Raising Hopes, and Increasing Criticism, L.A. Tnvms MAG., Mar. 6, 1994, at 18, 43. ("Last
fall, the procedure [intracytoplasmic sperm injection or ISCI, a technique to insert a single
sperm into an ova's center] won its 15 minutes of fame here, touted in headlines and on
'Donahue' and 'Eye to Eye with Connie Chung,' as the panacea for male infertility. 'In big
urban centers, people will call around to clinics asking, "Do you offer it?"' notes Barry
Behr, director of the human embryology and andrology lab at Stanford University. 'If you
say no, they'll call elsewhere. It's a rat race; you almost have to stay one-up on the pro-
gram down the road to get business."').
102. The control exercised by medicine may be over more than the norms of family
formation. The recent stories about the low success rates and high costs of procreative
technology use have also revealed that profit-motive may induce physicians to recommend
high tech treatments when low tech treatments may be effective. "Doctors inside and
outside the specialty said that to increase revenue, some unscrupulous clinics push patients
toward costly high-tech solutions when they would be just as successful with simpler treat-
ment." Trip Gabriel, High-Tech Pregnancies Test Hope's Limit, N.Y. Tnvms, Jan. 7, 1996, at
Al. The more serious question raised has been whether the high tech methods do anything
at all.
In 1989, the Canadian Government assembled a Royal Commission to come up
with guidelines and funding recommendations... The commissioners reviewed
hundreds of studies from international research on the use of reproductive tech-
nologies for infertility problems. Last year, they concluded that only one proce-
dure-standard 1VF for treatment of blocked tubes-had been proven in studies
to give women a better chance of birth-about 10% per attempt-than no treat-
ment at all.
Wartik, supra note 101, at 21.
103. Gabriel, supra note 102, at Al. Dr. William Ledger is chair of obstetrics and gyn-
ecology at Cornell. He oversees Cornell's fertility clinic. Id
The label reflects how the high tech/low tech distinction draws a line
between two groups of procreative technology users. The high tech
users are necessarily, by virtue of the clinic and legal rules, infertile
married couples.'0 4 Many of the low tech users do have physicians
perform the insemination, are married, and/or are infertile. The pre-
vailing understanding of self-insemination contains not only the
knowledge that many who self-inseminate are single women and les-
bian couples, but also the judgment that such technology use is out-
law. It is, with snide overtones, the backroom conception.
It is interesting that within the dominant parts of the in/fertility
discourses, the term "artificial" insemination is well-accepted. But
many marginalized within the discourses-particularly lesbians-ob-
ject to "artificial" insemination, and prefer "insemination" or "self-
insemination." The objection is based on the point that the semen
and the children born after conception by insemination are natural.
This suggests that within the dominant discourses, "artificial" serves
the purpose of making insemination a technology, a human invention
to be controlled by man. The rejection of "artificial" shifts the mean-
ing not only of the method of conception, but also of the place of
procreation with respect to women's lives. "Insemination," and "self-
insemination" in particular, claim the process of conception as well as
the fact of conception and the resulting parenthood as natural. This
redefinition speaks of self-definition, and conscious effort to create a
space for these parent-child relationships as "family." The discourses
of in/fertility, then, are contested from within.
I. Identity Boundaries
Within the discourses of in/fertility, the meanings of human/in-
vention and un/natural change. They do not by themselves determine
the boundaries of procreative technology use. Indeed, they seem to
have little substance. Instead, human/invention and un/natural are
line drawing mechanisms, ways we have of saying that one side is priv-
ileged, normative, and central relative to the other. Exploring the mo-
ments of unease and the rules that set the boundaries of use tells us
which social categories are at stake. More importantly, the moments
104. Ironically, the visibility of these married couples among high tech users and not
among low tech users may be due to the success of the low tech methods for infertile
couples. Since infertility carries a social stigma, many infertile couples do not reveal that
they are being treated for infertility. But since the high tech methods have attracted public
attention, so have those who use these methods. Those who use the low tech methods can
escape publicity, unless their use steps over the boundaries.
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of unease and the medical and legal rules tell us a bit about how and
when race, class, sexual orientation, age, and gender may become a
point on the line. Now I turn to the particular identifies across which
the lines are drawn to find out how the boundaries are maintained.
A. High Tech Women
So what really lies at the high tech, low tech point on the line?
The identities inscribed with high tech use form the right side of the
line. They are, of course, the in/fertile. And for the most part, they
are women. As a matter of medical fact, men comprise half of those
diagnosed as infertile.105 But whether it is a man or woman who is
infertile, the technology is used on the woman. 06 And it is the wo-
man who is not pregnant. Therefore, as a normative matter, it is the
woman who is in/fertile.10 7 On the other side of the line the identities
inscribed with low tech use are forming. Most who use the low tech
methods are infertile couples. But their use is irrelevant to the high
tech, low tech distinction. That point of difference serves the purpose
of designating some users as deserving of access, and designating some
use as illicit. So the line is drawn on the bodies of high tech women
and low tech lesbians.
Those on the high tech side have been deemed not only infertile,
but also fit for use. They are women because they "should be"
mothers. The answers to the questions, who should be the parents
and which women should be mothers converge at this point where
race (white) and economic privilege meet. On the low tech side of the
line, race and class matter less. It is lesbianness that prevents these
women from being infertile, and therefore not fit for use. Of course,
105. For couples diagnosed as infertile, the woman has the physical defect causing in-
fertility 40% of the time, the man is identified as the source of the problem 40% of the
time, and no cause is found 20% of the time. JOHN YEH & MOLLY U. YEH, LEGAL As-
PECTs OF INFERTiLrrY 6-7 (1991).
106. For example, intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) in which the doctor uses a
tiny needle to manually insert a single sperm into an ova, is used when the man has a
subnormal sperm count, but it is the woman who undergoes the most invasive procedures
to achieve pregnancy.
107. See, e.g., Howard W. Jones, Jr. & James P. Toner, The Infertile Couple, 329 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 1710 (1993). From the opening paragraph, the authors of The Infertile
Couple link infertility with women and treatment with couples. "Since 1988, the problem
of infertility has increased in several ways. First, there are more infertile women in the
population .... Second, a larger proportion of infertile couples now seek treatment." lId at
1710. After interviewing couples experiencing infertility, Arthur Greil noted that "both
husbands and wives seemed to identify infertility as mainly the wife's problem." ARTHUR
L. GREmt, NOT YET PREGNANT. INFERTILE COUPLES iN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 108
(1991).
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within the dominant parts of the in/fertility discourses, these women
are not quite women. This indicates that at the point of convergence,
where "should be" lies, "woman" and "mother" conflate. That is,
whiteness, middle class status, and a particular permutation of
gendered woman form the right side of the line, while a raceless, class-
less, denatured woman forms on the other side of the line.
One irony that falls out of the high tech, low tech distinction is
that one reading of the words makes the high tech woman more tech
than woman, and the low tech lesbian more natural by comparison.
Perhaps this reading is imaginable because high tech procreative
methods seem to transform the users into both products and produ-
cers. These women, after all, are "fit for use," or warrantied for moth-
erhood. Or, consider the many accounts of women and men who have
tried several cycles of in vitro fertilization or have tried several differ-
ent technologies' 08 despite evidence that the chances of taking home a
child decline from approximately 20% to less than 5% over four
tries.'0 9 It is not that those who make multiple attempts to have a
child using procreative technology lack reason or agency.1 0 But
within the in/fertility discourses, some high tech users become not sim-
108. See, e.g., Wartik, supra note 101, at 20; Begley, supra note 41, at 38-39, 40.
109. One study that pooled data from two programs that use in vitro fertilization with
embryo replacement and gamete intrafallopian transfer showed 20% and 19% pregnancy
rates. Stephen L. Corson et al., Outcome in 242 in vitro fertilization-embryo replacement or
gamete intrafallopian transfer-induced pregnancies, 51 FERTILITY & STERILrrY 644, 644, 647
(1989). But those rates do not reflect ectopic pregnancies, and spontaneous abortions.
Another study, based on 1992 data, reports that "if the woman was younger than 40 years
and there was no male factor [infertility], the term delivery rate was 16.8% per.., cycle."
Collins, supra note 81, at 1162. A 1992 study indicates that the chance of pregnancy may
decrease with each successive cycle. See Wartik, supra note 101, at 42. In addition, studies
show that some infertile couples achieve conception and have children without medical
intervention. Greil reports that "while 41 percent of couples treated for infertility subse-
quently conceived, so did 35 percent of those who had not received treatment." GREIL,
supra note 107, at 32. In fact, Canada's Royal Commission has concluded that only one
procedure, in vitro fertilization, effectively increases chances of pregnancy, and only where
blocked fallopian tubes cause the infertility. The Commission report says that the increase
is about 10% per cycle. ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES,
PROCEED WITH CARE: FINAL REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW REPRODUC-
TIVE TECHNOLOGIES 517-24 (1993). See also Assisted Reproductive Technology in the U.S.
and Canada, 62 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1121 (1994).
110. See, e.g., this reported dialogue with an infertile couple, Mrs. and Mr. B: Mrs. B:
"I don't want to go through these procedures just for the sake of participating in them and
say, 'Well I went to the Super Bowl of infertility.' I'd like to know if there's a chance that
this would work, and nobody can really give you that percentage chance. They say
'maybe'-that's the worst." Collins, supra note 81, at 1159. For a description of strategies
used by women to maximize control over the treatment process, see GREIL, supra note 107,
at 80-87 (discussing efforts to become expert on infertility, changing doctors, negotiating
timing of diagnosis and treatment cycles).
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ply consumers, but self-described gamblers, "addicted" to treat-
ment,' caught by the chance of that big win-a take home baby.
112
Those for whom the high tech methods have failed are caught in a no-
win situation. They are damned if they do try again-because of the
expense, the low odds, the emotional and physical tolls. They are
damned if they don't-because they are then no longer infertile, but
sterile.
I am intrigued by the gambling metaphor used by the infertile
and their doctors not because I think infertile women are self-deluded
addicts, nor because I think they should not use the technology. But
the gambling metaphor seems to me to be an uncannily, and perhaps
unconsciously, accurate description of the way procreative technology
has been purveyed. Many fertility clinics post their odds or advertise
their success rates," 3 just as Las Vegas Casinos do. So while the gam-
bling metaphors focus attention on the "gamblers," the infertile wo-
men, they also reveal something about the character of the business
side of procreative technology use. It is the character of the business
that indicates that "infertility treatment" may offer a partial descrip-
tion at best, or a misnomer at worst, of procreative technology use by
those deemed infertile.114 "In/fertility industry" captures those as-
pects of procreative technology use that reproduces in/fertility for
profit and other gains." 5
111. "You almost feel like you've got a bug for gambling. You say, 'What else is there
to try, what else have you got?"' Begley, supra note 41, at 47 (quoting Valerie Hendy). "I
won't ask for more than two tries. But you go in every time thinking, this is the time it's
going to work." Wartik, supra note 101, at 20 (quoting John Taylor). Both Taylor and his
spouse, Leslie Taylor, have undergone corrective surgery and tried fertility drugs. In addi-
tion, Leslie Taylor has undergone intra-uterine insemination twice and in vitro fertilization
twice. The method John Taylor referred to in his comment involves injecting sperm di-
rectly into an egg. The text of the article comments, "[t]his could be the Taylors' winning
ticket in the baby lottery." Id.
112. Since the industry's use of pregnancy rates has been criticized as misleading, be-
cause those rates do not take spontaneous abortions, ectopic pregnancies, and still-births
into account, clinics have began advertising birth rates as "take home baby rates." Wartik,
supra note 101, at 21.
113. For a discussion of infertility clinics as an industry, and the industry's use of adver-
tising, see Gabriel, supra note 102, at Al.
114. Among the recent events indicating that profit sometimes supersedes treatment
goals, consider the following. In 1995, a dozen scientists left the Cornell fertility clinic
laboratory after complaining that the high volume of patients had resulted in an over-
crowded lab and unsafe conditions for the in vitro embryos. Id. The Federal Trade Com-
mission has obtained cease-and-desist orders against several clinics for advertising inflated
success rates. Begley, supra note 41, at 40.
115. Patricia Spallone has argued that "reproductive researchers use women's bodies
as the 'raw materials' of scientific inquiry," or as experimental subjects for the pursuit of
scientific knowledge rather than treatment. SPALLONE, supra note 2, at 84.
There is another sense in which the technology inscribes itself on
those deemed in/fertile in a way that speaks of production. In an es-
say that examines "the identity and difference between the work that
people do and the work that machines do," Alexandra Chasin refers
to the Marxist tradition of distinguishing between productive labor
and reproductive labor:1
16
Where the former is invested in commodities whose distribu-
tion and sales profit the owner of the means of production, the lat-
ter supports and maintains the activities of production.
Reproductive labor conditions the support and maintenance of cul-
tural and technical systems ... as well as the uninterrupted control
of production, whether by owner, state, or most likely, some combi-
nation of the two. 1
17
Within the in/fertility discourses, the work that infertile women per-
form to become procreative maintains the cultural significance of
motherhood and its use as a means of social control." 8 The sacrifices
infertile women make to become mothers is taken as proof that they
should be mothers and that motherhood is important. Comments
made by women using procreative technology indicate that for them,
motherhood has personal emotional and social significance. But the
emotional and social consequences are read as evidence that mater-
nity is inherent, natural, and desirable for women. That is, a woman's
particular hopes and needs are translated into cultural artifact-moth-
erhood-that has symbolic meaning and results in practices that sup-
port production.
Motherhood as a cultural system simultaneously reproduces an
understanding of women as inherently and inevitably responsible for
domestic labor, both physical and moral, and it preserves the assump-
tion that reproductive labor is predominantly feminine while produc-
tive labor is predominantly masculine in nature. Motherhood
describes women as mothers whether or not they have babies. The
ultimate irony is that within the in/fertility discourses, it is women who
give birth, but it is men who perform the productive labor. Procrea-
tive technology use has provided opportunity to extend largely patri-
archal significations of pregnancy and birth. While many women
choose procreative technology use over adoption so that they may ex-
perience pregnancy and childbirth, pregnancy is also read as evidence
116. Chasin, Class and Its Close Relations, in POSTHUMAN BODIES, supra note 2, at 77.
117. Id. at 77-78.
118. See Carol Sanger, M is for the Many Things, 1 S. CAL. REv. oF L. & WOMEN'S
STUDIES 15, 31-39, 51-55 (1992) (revealing "maternal essentialism," the belief that the true
"whatness" of women is motherhood, and how maternal essentialism shapes our under-
standing of infertile women).
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that "daddy planted a seed."1 19 In addition, procreative technology
use further segregates and devalues the significance of pregnancy and
birth from the genetic link.120 So the desire of women who want to
experience childbirth and pregnancy is trivialized compared to the
goal of using the ova and sperm of the married couple.
121
If women as mothers perform reproductive labor, they are proba-
bly service workers. Service is "a kind of labor that is immediately
consumed or exhausted. That is, it cannot be stored, accumulated, or
saved. Service is exhausted in its performance."'' 2 On a simpler level
of analysis, mothers serve, and they do it with pleasure. Certainly, this
willingness is implied, if not expressed, in the stories and images of
infertile women. This description of motherhood places infertile wo-
men in a lower class position than the economic status of the infertile
would indicate. Middle class women as mothers are simultaneously
servants and employers. It is the middle class woman who can and
does hire other women to do household labor, 23 thus delegating part
of her role as woman and transferring her gender subordination by
virtue of her race and class privilege.124 Yet it is the infertile middle
class woman who uses procreative technology to affirm her place as a
mother and service worker.
119. Rothman, supra note 2, at 40-47.
120. Roberts, supra note 87, at 937.
121. Part of the reason that egg donation may be causing less unease than I expected is
that a formal notion of gender equality has been used to say that egg donation is like sperm
donation. Yet the lack of unease about use of sperm donation has been premised, in part,
on the acceptability of the image of sperm as seeds. This image, in turn, traces back to the
use of stigmas on pregnancy as a means of sexual control over women. If an unwed woman
became pregnant, the pregnancy is stigmatized as evidence that the woman had sex. The
seed image operates here to minimize the significance of the man's participation. At the
same time, pregnancy is treated as evidence of male virility. So what stigmatizes the wo-
man also valorizes the man. Again, the seed image operates here. It is natural, as is the
uncontrollability of man's (hetero)sexuality. The importance attributed to the genetic link
follows from this history. What follows from the genetic link-the child's resemblance to
the father-evidences the man's sexual strength and his sexual control over the woman.
Infertility raises questions about the man's virility. The response is to shift the emphasis
from the means of conception to the components of conception-the genetic components.
The primacy given to the genetic contribution allows men the continued right to hoist the
flag over procreation.
122. Chasin, in Pos'rUMAN BODmS, supra note 2, at 78.
123. Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Women, In Practice and Theory: A Reply to
Catherine McKinnon, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMImSM 217, 239-42 (1993).
124. Judith Rollins, Ideology and Servitude, in AT WoRK rN HoMEs: HOUSEHOLD
WORKERS IN WORD PERSPECrwIV 77, 78 (Roger Sanjek & Shellee Colen eds., 1990).
B. The In/fertile
The last part of the discussion suggests that another point on the
line is bounded by the identities of infertile women as white, middle
class women and those who receive the transfer of subordination. I
am not referring to women who are actually hired as domestic labor,
but to women characterized as only fit for low status labor by virtue of
their race and class. 125 Just as class (middle), race (white), and marital
status (married) qualify infertile women as those who should be
mothers, class (low income), race (nonwhite), and marital status (sin-
gle) mark the women on the other side of the line as not fit for moth-
erhood. Their apparent fertility makes them "too fertile." So infertile
women can use procreative technology to fulfill their natural role as
mothers, while avoiding the most stigmatized and oppressive work of
women by hiring others.126 Poor women of color are deemed destined
for low status labor, while their work as mothers is stigmatized.
I can identify infertile women and too fertile women as groups
because there were already stories and images attached to these iden-
tities. The groups were pre-constructed. The stories and images seem
to explain the predicament of women read through these identities.
And the explanations implicitly ascribe causal power to race, gender,
and class.
Upon reviewing the texts-medical, legal, and media news-that
I have used to trace the in/fertility discourses, I find that there are two
types of descriptors for in/fertile women.127 There are vital statistics
indicating that in/fertile women who seek treatment are over thirty128;
125. As one result of the Industrial Revolution, "the home was no longer seen as the
site of 'work,' and paid 'housework' was regarded by employers as low status, even stigma-
tized work, or not real work at all." Sanjek & Colen, I: Orientations, in AT WORK IN
HoMES, supra note 124, at 4. Historically and currently, women of color have actually
performed domestic work and have been representative of domestic workers. During and
after slavery, African American women formed a large part of the domestic labor force. In
the latter part of the 20th century, Asian American women and Latinas, many of them
immigrants, have become a disproportionate part of this sector. Chasin, in POSTHUMAN
BODIES, supra note 2, at 81.
126. For an analysis of how "the dominant family ecology entails an ideal-worker hus-
band supported by a flow of domestic services from his wife," which for high-status fami-
lies means hiring other people to do other domestic work, see Joan Williams, Is Coverture
Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2236-42 (1994).
127. In the statutes, the only descriptors are gender and marital status. In the cases, a
little about class status emerges as well. But race is not expressly mentioned, even in the
surrogacy cases discussed.
128. The mean age for female patients at one center was 33.1 years and 31.8 years at
the second center. The average male ages at the two centers were 35.7 and 34.5. Corson,
supra note 109, at 645.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47
April 1996] THE IN/FERTILE, THE TOO FERTILE, AND THE DYSFERTILE 1043
and as discussed, in/fertile women are typically white, middle class,
and married. The other type of descriptor provides explanations,
which then become inextricably linked with the vital statistics. Both
the medical and media accounts of procreative technology use refer to
the frustration, despair and hope that the infertile experience during
the diagnosis and treatment process.129 These descriptions call for
empathy with the infertile. The accounts also refer, usually subtly, to
negative views of infertile women held by the public. More specifi-
cally, the negative views seem to say that because infertile women are
economically privileged, they do not need support or sympathy.130
These views tend to be described as a response to the demand for
legislation requiring insurance coverage of procreative technology
use. So one explanatory story links infertile women with class. But
what is the rest of the story?
A medical journal article stated, "[p]art of the resistance to pay-
ing for a lot of these treatments is the thought that all these women
are just upper middle-class women who have a lot of money and they
delay childbearing to have a career.' u31 A newspaper article quoted a
psychotherapist who counsels infertile women: "Part of the myth that
really gets me is this idea that women have just kind of postponed
pregnancy because of their careers."' 32 In other words, the message
in the story about infertile women is that they put career before mar-
riage and motherhood. Social historian, Margarete Sandelowski, has
traced the tendency within the in/fertility discourse, to conflate volun-
tary and involuntary infertility and "to suggest that infertile women
who seek to achieve motherhood may not really want it."133 When
you think about the opposition within the explanatory story for infer-
tility, the attribution of volition becomes clear. The story sets up self-
ishness in opposition to motherhood. Motherhood is about
129. See ag., Jones & Toner, supra note 107, at 1710 ("When those who desire children
find their efforts unsuccessful, frustration, despair, and helplessness are common and
debilitating consequences."); Felicia R. Lee, Infertile Couples Forge Ties Within Society of
Their Own, N.Y. TnMEs, Jan. 9,1996, at Al (describing formation of support groups by and
for infertile couples).
130. See e.g., Rubin, supra note 32, at N1 ("[M]edical knowledge is offset by the more
disturbing aspects of turning a baby into a commodity. 'To invest so much time, money,
emotions into having a child is troubling behavior,' said Mahowald. 'It's saying, "This is
something I want so much that I must have it at all costs."').
131. See, eg., Collins, supra note 81, at 1163.
132. Elizabeth Mehren, Testing the Limits: Thanks to Bold New Technology, a Woman
Can Give Birth in her 40s, 50s and 60s. But Should She?, L.A. TiKEs, Feb. 6, 1994, at El.
133. Margarete Sandelowski, Failures of Volition: Female Agency and Infertility in His-
torical Perspective, in TiEs THAT BImN: ESSA-YS ON MOTHEMRNG AND PATRIARCHY 35, 56-
57 (Jean F. O'Barr et al. eds., 1990).
selflessness, not only on behalf of children, but also on behalf of soci-
ety.' 34 The explanatory story privileges a particularly domestic, essen-
tialized notion of selflessness and devalues achievements that threaten
this image of social order. The story offers a moral about women who
have too much control and operates as a response to the feminist call
for women's liberation.
The same theme about the price of control runs through a slightly
different explanatory story. This story is premised on one assumed
and one accepted medical fact. The assumed fact is that contraceptive
use by women can cause infertility. 135 The accepted fact is that sexu-
ally transmitted disease may result in blocked fallopian tubes or other
problems causing infertility. 136 This story is about the liberated wo-
man who sought not only sexual freedom but also freedom from the
consequences of her deviant sexuality. The message here is that infer-
tility is the price women must pay for sexual freedom and reproduc-
tive control. 37 Remember that by virtue of their race and class,
infertile women are the women who should be mothers. The fact that
these women have tried to have children reinforces the assumption
that the "should be" women are naturally mothers. The explanatory
story, particularly when coupled with the prevalence of accounts
about successful procreative technology use, becomes a vindication of
motherhood as the primary role for women. In these stories, the in-
fertile were always mothers; they were the only ones who did not real-
ize that. It was their exercise of choice and control that denatured
them. And it is the use of technology that can restore them to nature.
134. For a discussion tracing the selfless mother to the race -nd class-based ideology of
the late-nineteenth/early twentieth century privileged, see Ikemoto, supra note 15, at 1210-
19.
135. While a high percentage of those women who have sought treatment for infertility
have used the pill or any contraceptive method, infertile women have been less likely to
have used the pill, IUD, or other methods than fecund women. Marilyn B. Hirsch & Wil-
liam D. Mosher, Characteristics of Infertile Women in the United States and Their Use of
Infertility Services, 47 FERTmrrY & STERILIY 618, 621-22 (1987).
136. Women diagnosed as infertile were more likely than fecund women to have been
treated for pelvic inflammatory disease which is typically attributable to sexually transmit-
ted disease. Id. at 621. One study has shown that physicians are more likely to misdiag-
nose endometriosis as pelvic inflammatory disease in black women than in white women.
Donald L. Chatman, Endometriosis in the Black Woman, 125 AMER. J. OBSTrET. &
GYNECOL. 987, 987-88 (1976). This suggests that physicians are imposing race-based as-
sumptions about sexual activity and promiscuity in the diagnosis process.
137. Sandelowski, supra note 133, at 36. Following the in/fertility discourse back in
time, Naomi Pfeffer locates this morality tale in the late-nineteenth century. "Sterility
... denoted a barren mind and body." PFEFFER, supra note 10, at 34.
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C. The Too Fertile
While the problem of infertility has been labelled a medical prob-
lem, and read as the result of a problematic social trend, the problem
of the too fertile has been clearly labelled first and foremost as a social
problem. So law and media texts, not medical texts provide the ex-
planatory stories and images, even though, to some extent, the prob-
lem has been medicalized.138 Here, I rely on the records of recent
senate and house debates about "welfare reform" and on news media
accounts.
It is interesting that in the media coverage of those moments of
conflict discussed above, several reports drew direct comparisons be-
tween the granny moms and the too fertile. Consider this comment:
What has the woman [the 59 year old British woman who had
twins] done that merits such ethical concern and public criticism?
She isn't an unmarried, 15-year-old high school dropout whose un-
planned baby will put her on welfare, perhaps for decades. She isn't
21 and having her fourth baby by four men, none of whom will ac-
tively father their children.
She hasn't been using crack or other illegal drugs during preg-
nancy, condemning her unborn infant to neurological problems of
unpredictable severity. She's not passing along the AIDS virus or
forcing fetal alcohol syndrome on her child by her drinking. She's
not risking her baby's health by skipping prenatal care. Her twins
aren't the unintended and unwanted consequences of careless
sex.
139
The problems ascribed to the too fertile become the standard
against which troubling technology use gets measured. In this com-
parison, the too fertile are simultaneously a problem of nature and of
inappropriate intervention. When read within the broader discourse
about deviantly fertile women, the too fertile woman's race and class
emerge as natural explanations for her hyper-sexuality and promiscu-
ity. On the other hand, in the context of the debate about welfare
138. CONSTANCE A. NATHANSON, DANGEROUS PASSAGE: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF
SEXUALITY IN WOMEN'S ADOLESCENCE 48 (1991).
139. Joan Beck, There are Far Worse Things a Parent Can Be Than Old, CH. TRIB.,
Jan. 2,1994, at C3. See also Steve Steinberg, Twins' Birth to Woman, 59, Raises Whole New
Set of Difficult Questions, ATL. CONST., Dec. 30, 1993, at A4 ("'There's a lot of concern
that a child born to a 59-year-old woman will face a set of problems that a child born to a
woman of 25 wouldn't face, including the early loss of parents,' Nelson [medical ethicist at
the Hastings Center] says. 'But you could tell a similar story about a child born in deprived
circumstances, say a ghetto,' he says. 'The difference is that poor women don't have any
problems getting pregnant, while a 59-year-old will only get pregnant if you use all sorts of
high-tech bells and whistles."').
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reform, the woman's dependency and lack of education result from
misguided government intervention.
This comment, like recent political debates, combines a series of
stories about deviant fertility that have emerged over the years. The
identity stories about unwed pregnancy and motherhood consistently
have been framed as calls for social control over women. But the crux
of the problem and the explanations have changed over time and va-
ried according to race and class.
It is probably obvious that sexual activity and pregnancy among
the never married are what make fertility in these stories deviant. But
it is the details of how these stories were told, and the similarities and
differences that emerge in the stories now being told that reveal shifts
in societal stress points and how gender, race, and class have changed
to accommodate these shifts. In addition, tracing the stories as they
evolved over time shows that particular gender-race-class confluences
appear continuously and in such a way that the identity strands of
gender, race, and class have become melded and cannot be traced
separately.
Both Regina Kunzel and Rickie Solinger have tracked the central
importance of race in the constructs of unmarried mothers to the
1940s.140 Unwed motherhood has been recognized as a major social
problem at least two times since then-the late 1970s, and now. Dur-
ing both times, race has continued to shape our understanding of the
problem. What triggered public attention on unwed motherhood in
each instance was the sudden realization that white middle class wo-
men constituted a significant group of unwed mothers. In other
words, the assumption that unwed pregnancy and motherhood is a
problem of black women and poor white women has been persistent.
The fact that middle class white women become pregnant and bear
children out of wedlock then comes as a surprise. That fact, in turn,
seems to prove that the problem is out of control, that the race and
class barriers have been breached.
During the World War II period, pregnancy by white middle class
women came to light and challenged the prevailing assumption that
unwed pregnancy was a problem of the lower classes that occurred
140. REGINA G. KUNZEL, FALLEN WOMEN, PROBLEM GIRLS: UNMARRIED MOTHERS
AND THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL WORK, 1890-1945 (1993); RICKIE SOLINGER,
WAKE Up LITTLE SUSIE: SINGLE PREGNANCY AND RACE BEFORE ROE V. WADE (1992).
For a history of motherhood and welfare before the 1940s, see Gwendolyn Mink, The Lady
and the Tramp: Gender, Race, and the Origins of the American Welfare State, in WOMEN,
THE STATE, AND WELFARE 92-122 (Linda Gordon ed., 1990).
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because of lower moral standards inherent in those classes. 141 Those
who managed unwed pregnancy, social workers, responded by provid-
ing a new explanation for pregnancy among white middle class wo-
men. "The increasing presence of middle-class girls and women in
maternity homes and social agencies led social workers to reevaluate
the causes behind out-of-wedlock childbearing in an attempt to re-
move them from the larger category of 'sex delinquency."'1 42 From
the World War II period, pregnancy among unmarried white women
has been explained as individual pathology.143 At the same time,
pregnancy among unmarried African American women has been at-
tributed to sociological pathology.144 So, black women who bore chil-
dren before marriage were in need of control and punishment. And
white middle class pregnant women were in need of treatment.1 45 The
parallels between these explanatory stories and those used now are
telling. Then and now, the race of women of color is used to charac-
terize out-of-wedlock childbearing as evidence of inherent character
weaknesses. And then and now, deviance among white, middle class
women is characterized as individual, medical, and treatable.
In the 1970s, the issue was framed as one of pregnancy, rather
than childbearing. So, in the 1940s, much of the problem-solving fo-
cused on the use of adoption, whereas in the 1970s, the problem-solv-
ing focused on preventing pregnancy. Pregnancy may have been the
issue because the group of white middle class women at issue were
adolescents. 146 In the 1970s, the problem was specifically identified as
one of "teenage pregnancy." In other words, the youth of the women
highlighted the inappropriateness of their sexual activity.147 In fact,
141. Kunzel, supra note 140, at 146.
142. Id. at 147.
143. Id. at 147-152 (describing how social workers adopted psychiatrists diagnoses of
illegitimacy as a neurotic symptom, "a purposeful, albeit unconscious act").
144. Id at 157-59. See also SOLINGER, supra note 140, at 26-27.
145. SOLINGER, supra note 140, at 24-25. One result of the race-based explanations for
out-of-wedlock pregnancy is that white women were encouraged, and even coerced into
giving their children up for adoption. The hope was that these women could then start
over, get married, and have children within marriage. Black women were encouraged to
keep their children. Ursula Gallagher of the United States Children's Bureau stated, "[i]n
some courts it is almost impossible for a Negro unmarried mother to give up her baby for
adoption. The general interpretation of this is that courts believe the girl should be made
to support her children and should be punished by keeping them." Id. at 26-27.
146. NATHANSON, supra note 138, at 56.
147. Id. at 4 ("Pregnancy makes sex visible; it converts private behavior into public
behavior. Adolescent pregnancy is the curiously enigmatic label adopted by late twentieth-
century Americans to signal and demand attention to a centuries-old problem: the depar-
ture of single young women from age- and gender-based norms of sexual propriety.").
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the population report that triggered the public's attention described
two significant social changes-the rate of marriage among teenagers
had decreased, and the percentage of sexually active teenagers had
increased. 148 But the public focused on the second change as the
problematic one.
The response to the problem of unwed motherhood was shaped
by the pro-choice and liberal ideology. The goal was to educate teen-
agers about the consequences of sexual activity. The promotion of sex
education was strongly linked to the way the problem had been
framed-as one of white, middle class suburban kids. The identity of
the audience made the education goal seem plausible. The solution
assumed that the teenagers could be educated and could learn to use
birth control under medical supervision.149 But during this same time
period, the problem of unwed motherhood among African American
women was tied to the cycle of dependency perpetuated by welfare.
So in the 1970s, unwed pregnancy among whites was again character-
ized as treatable. Unwed pregnancy among African Americans was
identified as social pathology. In addition, the welfare mother image
emerged to embody the combination of dependency, over-fertility,
and Blackness that caused the pathology.
The current debate about deviant fertility emerged in the late
1980s. But the key moments have occurred in the 1990s. Newspapers
published articles about out-of-wedlock pregnancy and childbearing at
a higher rate during three moments of this decade. First, then-Vice
President Dan Quayle, in May 1992, made use of a story line in Mur-
phy Brown, a popular television sitcom, to emphasize his conclusion
that a "poverty of values" caused the mass street violence that took
place in Los Angeles that year.150 In the story line, the main charac-
ter, a single, white, professional woman, became pregnant and had a
148. The report appeared in an Alan Guttmacher Institute publication, Family Plan-
ning Perspectives. A 1976 special issue on "Teenagers USA" contained these facts. For a
discussion of media and political attention given to these publications, see NATHANSON,
supra note 138, at 46-50.
149. NATHANSON, supra note 138, at 186.
150. Quayle made this speech on May 19, 1992 to the Commonwealth Club in San
Francisco, California. The unrest in Los Angeles occurred on April 29 through May 2,
1992. Quayle stated, "It doesn't help matters when prime-time TV has Murphy Brown-a
character who supposedly epitomizes today's intelligent, highly paid professional woman
mocking the importance of fathers by bearing a child alone and call it just another lifestyle
choice." Douglas Jehl, Quayle Links Riots to Family Breakdown, TV, SACRAMENTO BEE,
May 20, 1992, at Al.
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child. 51 Second, a June 1994 Census Bureau report showed that the
most significant rate of increase in out-of-wedlock pregnancy occurred
among white, college-educated women over 20 years of age. In fact,
the report proved that most unwed mothers are white. 5 2 Third, Presi-
dent Clinton and house and senate republicans placed unwed mother-
hood centrally in their plans for social reform. The centrality of this
issue emerged most clearly after the Fall 1994 elections resulted in
Republican control of both the house and senate, and the resulting
push for an agenda called the Contract with America.
The current debate combines elements of earlier stories, so that
the comment made in support of granny moms is not atypical. In
other words, one image operating in the in/fertility discourse is that of
the teenaged, substance-abusing, welfare-dependent, pre-natal care
shirking, disease-ridden woman who has several damaged and ill chil-
dren each sired by a different man. However, the most visible and
stigmatized identities in the discourse are those of women of color
who live in poverty. The problem is so strongly linked with race and
welfare that the traits of the all-in-one unwed mother are also strongly
linked with race and welfare.153 This has two effects. It simplifies-it
shifts attention away from substance-addiction, prenatal care, contra-
ceptive distribution, and AIDS prevention to the women themselves.
In addition, the conflation of unwed motherhood among poor women
of color with every other visible social ill makes unwed motherhood
among white women seem less problematic.
The stories about white, college educated women over twenty
bearing children out of wedlock, like the granny mom stories, provide
a point of comparison that proves welfare motherhood as the worst
case scenario. For example, in an interview following the speech in
which he referenced "Murphy Brown," Quayle distinguished the Mur-
phy Brown character as a non-typical unwed mother. "I think espe-
cially in her position, a highly successful professional woman, this
151. For a more extensive treatment of this moment, see Rebecca Walkowitz, Repro-
ducing Reality: Murphy Brown and Illegitimate Politics, in MEDIA SPECrACLE 40
(Marjorie Garber et al. eds., 1993).
152. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, FERTILTY OF AMERICAN WOMEN, CURRENT POP-
ULATION REPORTS, P20-482 (JUNE 1994).
153. "By blaming these women for their own poverty and, indeed, for the economic ills
of the entire nation, attention is diverted from the injustice of the racial and gendered
labor market and from the 'savage inequalities' increasingly characterizing U.S. society."
Leith Mullings, Households Headed by Women: The Politics of Race, Class, and Gender, in
CONcEVING THE NEw WORLD ORDER, supra note 2, at 131.
would be a real exception to have an unwed child, a big exception."'154
Whether or not Quayle used professional status as a proxy for race,
others clearly identified the distinguishing factor as race. "But on a
more fundamental level, the sophisticated professional woman played
by Candice Bergen bears almost no resemblance to most real-life un-
married mothers.... In real life, the highest percentages of unmarried
mothers are found among African Americans and Hispanics."'1 55
Within the in/fertility discourses, lack of economic privilege or profes-
sional status signals race.
Both the stories about unwed white mothers and about unwed
mothers of color contain messages about selfishness. But the selfish-
ness of unwed white women in these stories is more like that of infer-
tile women than of unwed mothers of color. The statistics indicate
that many of the unwed white women bearing children are teenagers.
But within the in/fertility discourses, the white women made visible
are the college-educated, over 20 years of age. And their fertility is
understood in a way that conflates voluntary and involuntary fertil-
ity. 5 6 In other words, these women, like infertile women, have too
much will. In this case, women are exercising too much control by not
waiting for marriage before having children, whereas infertile women
waited too long for marriage and children. For the unwed white
mother, society, rather than the woman, has to pay the price. 57 The
price it pays is moral decay. That's the result of her selfishness.
By comparison, women of color who bear children out of wed-
lock are selfish not from having too much will but from a failure of
volition. The failure seems to be inherent in their lives. Welfare de-
pendency of the 1990s parallels the social pathology explanation of the
1940s. Language and concepts from recent political debates over wel-
154. Jerry Roberts, Why Quayle Singled Out TV Show, S.F. CHRON., May 20, 1992, at
Al.
155. Barbara DaFoe Whitehead, Here She Is, America: Your New Ideal Mother, SEAT-
TLE TIMES, May 22, 1992, at All. After the Census Bureau report came out, the same
writer acknowledged that "[t]he biggest rate of increase in unwed childbearing has come
among women who probably have the greatest control over their fertility: college-educated
women." Then she attributed the high rates of adolescent pregnancy to the behavior of
older women. "One of the class responsibilities of adults is to set an example for children.
An example has been set." Barbara DaFoe Whitehead, At Risk Teens Just Following Adult
Example, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 5, 1995, at 33.
156. Whitehead, At Risk Teens Just Following Adult Example, HOUSTON CHRON.,
supra note 155.
157. See Illegitimacy in Fashion, the Stigma of Unwed Motherhood Wanes, But the Costs
to Mother, Child and Society Do Not, DAILY NEws OF L.A., July 15, 1993, at N18. Also
note that the commentary refers to illegitimacy in terms reminiscent of the 1970s "epi-
demic." Here, the phrase is "a plague was spreading." Id.
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fare and budget reform speak of how government has enabled per-
sonal failure. More specifically, the emphasis on "personal
responsibility" and "self-sufficiency," and on the need to teach values
and encourage independence with a tough-love approach expresses
the assumption that AFDC recipients only lack the necessary will.158
This characterizes the fertility among women of color who live in pov-
erty, as something like a disease, and in the process denies that any
such woman has agency.
The volitional failure in this discourse is contradictory. Within
this contradiction, women who need welfare cannot win. Public re-
sponse to a 1995 event illustrates this point. A pregnant woman saved
three of her children from their burning home. She gave birth by
Cesarean section four days later, and then died from her injuries. The
San Francisco newspapers that published accounts of her self-sacrifice
"received a flood of letters and calls condemning her for having five
children while on welfare."'159 Within the discourse, an act that could
be called the ultimate act of selfless motherhood is redescribed as one
necessitated only by her own irresponsibility.
The debates also assume that unwed mothers can choose, but
choose wrongly.160 Accounts of black grandmothers who self-sacrifice
to care for the children of their drug-addicted daughters are used to
illustrate this error.16' In these stories, the self-sacrifice of grandmoth-
ers necessitated by their daughters' failure is also the payment these
grandmothers must make for having been poor, black and fertile
themselves. The theme of punishment, articulated in the 1940s, reoc-
curs here.
158. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. H3352 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995) (statement of Mr.
Archer) ("The current welfare system destroys families and undermines the work ethic. It
traps people in a hopeless cycle of dependency.... Virtually every section of the bill
requires more personal responsibility... This bill will reverse the decades-long Federal
policy of rewarding unacceptable and self-destructive behavior."). See also Martha A.
Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DuKE LJ. 274, 277-89 (exposing
how poverty reform discourse links poverty with lack of a work ethic, and single mother-
hood with social pathology).
159. Mother Who Saved Three Children From Fire Dies of Burns, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 18,
1995, at A31.
160. See, eg., 141 CONG. Rnc. S13562 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1995) (statement of Mr. Fair-
cloth) ("The young teenager giving birth out of wedlock is simply repeating the pattern and
model which her mother laid down."). In this statement, the young teenager is not recog-
nized as having a say-so. The failure or bad choice was made by her mother or
grandmother.
161. See e.g., Laurie Petrie, Grandmother's Hand Rocks the Cradle, CINCINNATI POST,
Nov. 15, 1993, at 5A.
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The significance of marital status becomes apparent in the stories
that first characterize the too fertile as the reproducers of social ills,
and then identify the decline of marriage and/or fatherlessness as the
cause of that phenomenon. 162 The public debate has resurrected the
term "illegitimacy."'1 63 This shifts the focus from pregnancy back to
childbearing. That shift then allows room to call for marriage and fa-
therhood as solutions to all that ails us. Often, the public debate uses
fatherlessness interchangeably with unmarried status.164 One theme
in the public debate seems new-that unwed childbearing and
fatherlessness are now accepted as normal. Earlier debates may have
expressed fear that the marriage and two-parent family norms were
weakening. But the fear now is that those norms are gone.165
The aspect of the story that shifts attention to marriage and fa-
therhood comments both on unwed mothers of color and on white
unwed mothers. So one overarching theme has begun to emerge.
And it is one that places the male presence in the family front and
162. For example, recent welfare proposals have contained requirements to have un-
wed mothers identify the father of their children before receiving benefits, or to get mar-
ried. Newspaper editorials promoting marriage and the importance of fathers appeared
frequently in 1995 and 1996. See, e.g., Andrea Neal, Decline of Marriage in America, INDI-
ANAPOLIS STAR, May 18, 1995, at A10 ("society has passively accepted the decline of mar-
riage and turned its attention to fixing the effects: teen-age pregnancies, absent fathers,
neglected children, violent youths"); Lynn Smith, How Do Fathers Nurture, NEWS & OB-
SERVER (RALEIGH, N.C.), Mar. 21, 1995, at El ("Although many researchers think the
influence of the father has been denigrated in the past, they criticize as too simple the
recent claims of father advocates who have painted fathers as the saviors of a society riven
by crime, poverty, unwed childbearing and violence.").
163. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. H3449 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1995) (Speaker pro tempore
Mr. Oxley, introducing the bill: "Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Commit-
tee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill
(H.R. 4) to restore the American family, reduce illegitimacy, control welfare spending and
reduce welfare dependence."). In the Senate, Mr. Faircloth was largely responsible for the
emphasis on illegitimacy. For example, in supporting an amendment sponsored by Senator
Dole to H.R. 4, Mr. Faircloth repeatedly used the term, "multigenerational illegitimacy."
He stated, "If you vote against this amendment, you are voting to subsidize and promote
multigenerational illegitimacy." 141 CONG. REC. S13562 (daily ed., Sept. 14, 1995).
164. See Ellen Willis, Say It Loud Out of Wedlock and Proud, NEWSDAY, Feb. 11,
1994, at 70 ("To be sure, the image Bennett and Wehner mean to invoke when they call
unwed childbearing the 'road to economic poverty and social decay' is not white, middle
class or coupled.").
165. See, e.g., David Blankenhorn (author of FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING
OUR MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEMS (1995)), Beyond Social Policy: Taps for the Father-
hood Idea, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 1995, at A20 ("the wartime father-absence of the 1940s
occurred within, and was constrained by, what might be termed a culture of fatherhood.
Father-absence in the 1990s is occurring in, and fueled by, a culture of fatherlessness.");
Lynn Smith, Society Lending Legitimacy to Single, Never-Wed Parents, L.A. TIMas, July 22,
1993, at El.
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center. At this point, the medical and legal rules for procreative tech-
nology use, the identity stories of high tech women, the too fertile, and
the infertile converge. They each contain a message about the pri-
macy of institutions-marriage and fatherhood-that insist on a male
presence. They each use race and class, in a variety of ways, to natu-
ralize the male presence and denaturalize women in family structures
not centered on the male. So within the in/fertility discourses, mar-
riage and the presence of prospective fathers naturalize infertile wo-
men who use procreative technology. The absence of marriage and
fathers denatures unwed motherhood. White unwed mothers-pre-
sumed to be over twenty, educated, and mothers by choice-evidence
the extent of moral decay. But unwed mothers are perceived to be
the cause of that decay. Unwed mothers of color are measured in
terms of cost and data. This signifies that the harm they represent is
concrete and significant.
D. The Dysfertile
Stories about procreative technology use by lesbians and gay men
exists largely in the extreme margins of the in/fertility discourses. 166
As discussed, procreative technology use is little regulated at law, and
most of the legal rules reinforce marriage and opposite sex parenting.
They barely suggest that others might use the technology, or that
there might be other family structures. The medical rules also tend to
premise technology use on marriage. While some clinic rules permit
access to single women, the written medical texts simply do not ad-
dress procreative technology use by lesbians and gay men. There are
a few mainstream media news and popular culture accounts of gay
and lesbian procreation. But only a few. So, within the dominant
parts of the inlfertility discourses, lesbians and gay men are virtually
invisible. One can infer their presence by reading the other parts of
the in/fertility discourses through dominant gay and lesbian identity
constructs.
Procreation and parenthood are so strongly associated with het-
erosexuality and marriage that procreation and lesbians and
parenthood and gay men seem disassociated. I used the pairings, pro-
166. Of the written texts, the most affirming are the parenting books written by and for
lesbians and gay men. See, e.g., LESBIAN PARENTING: LrvING WITH PRIDE & PREJUDICE
(Katherine Amup ed., 1995); ERIC MARcus, THE MALE CoUPLE's GUIDE: FINDING A
MAN, MAKING A HOME, BUILDING A LIFE (1992); APRIL MARTIN, THE LESBIAN AND GAY
PARENTING HANDBOOK: CREATING AND RAISING OUR FAMILIES (1993); CHERI PIES,
CONSIDERING PARENTHOOD (2d ed. 1988); JEL S. POLLACK, LESBIAN AND GAY FAMILIES:
REDEFINING PARENTING IN AMERICA (1995).
creation-lesbian and parenthood-gay men, intentionally. I believe
that for women, procreation is mediated largely by the presence of the
masculine, and that for men, parenthood is mediated largely by the
feminine.
For infertile women, it is marriage and the presence of potential
fathers, in part, that qualify them as women, and as women who
should be mothers. For too fertile women, it is sexual activity while
not married and mothering in the absence of fathers that stigmatize
unwed motherhood. So heterosexuality, marital status and procrea-
tion are either positively or negatively, but apparently inherently,
linked. The independence from men in lesbian sexuality and social
intimacy de-links lesbian identity from procreation. Remember that
within the in/fertility discourses, woman's work as mother is reproduc-
tive labor, and that man performs the productive work. In other
words, pregnancy and childbearing have been segregated and trivial-
ized compared to the power attributed to the male seed. So lesbian
sexuality denies women access to the seed, and therefore denies them
access to the power to procreate.
Anthropologist Ellen Lewin has observed, "[lesbians, after all,
were assumed to be creatures defined by their sexual appetites and
thus were seen to be at odds with the kind of selfless devotion ex-
pected of mothers."1 67 Motherhood defines women who should be or
are mothers as nonsexual. The fact that procreative technology use
separates sexuality from procreation may have seemed not unnatural
because white, middle class women-those who should be mothers-
use the technology. They were already defined as nonsexual and sim-
ply reproductive. So even when lesbians identify themselves as
mothers, they may remain invisible, simply because lesbian identity as
reflected in the dominant parts of the discourse stands in opposition
to, not within, motherhood.168
The invisibility of gay men in the in/fertility discourse may be
more acute than that of lesbians. Even though the male seed is under-
stood to be the source of procreative power, male procreation de-
pends on the biological capacity of women to carry and give birth to
the child. So it is at least possible to imagine a lesbian woman as preg-
nant, giving birth, and therefore becoming a mother. But it seems
difficult, at best, to imagine how a gay man would have a child. His
167. Ellen Lewin, On the Outside Looking In: The Politics of Lesbian Motherhood, in
CONCEIVING THE NEw WORLD ORDER, supra note 2, at 103.
168. Id.
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sexual orientation simultaneously makes sexual intimacy with men
and women seem unnatural.
Perhaps more important is that social fatherhood depends on
motherhood. It may be that existing stories about unwed fathers dis-
rupt our ability to perceive gay men as fathers. Unwed fathers to chil-
dren of unwed mothers are marked by their absence from the family
structure. Active parenthood outside of marriage, then, seems un-
likely. In addition, the ability of men to achieve stability in intimate
relationships is also understood to be contingent on the presence of
women. Masculinity is partly about the uncontrolled sexual drive of
men that inhibits their ability to form stable relationships until they
choose or commit to do so. In marriage, men "settle down." Stories
about gay men often emphasize their promiscuity. The implication is
that two gay men in a relationship are potentially more unstable than
men in heterosexual relationships. So the formation of a marriage-
like relationship in which to raise a child appears inconsistent with gay
male identity. Finally, motherhood attributes qualities we deem nec-
essary to parenting to women. Fatherhood has largely been about bal-
ancing the emotional aspects of mothering with authority. But
because gay male identity has been feminized, gay men are caught
between the twin assumptions that they lack the stability and nurtur-
ing capacity to mother and the authority to father children.
Even while I write about the invisibility of lesbians and gay men
in the in/fertility discourses, I am conscious of the fact that lesbians
and gay men do use procreative technologies to become parents. 169
Despite their extreme marginalization within the in/fertility dis-
courses, both lesbians and gay men are procreative and forming par-
ent-child relationships through technology use. In fact, one can find
references to a "lesbian baby boom. ' 170 So, perhaps it is more accu-
rate to say that lesbians and gay men are becoming parents largely
independent of the medical establishment. 71 The question this raises
169. The parenting books, cited supra at note 166, typically discuss alternative insemi-
nation as the method available for women and surrogacy as the method available for men.
170. See e.g., Marilyn Kalfus et al., High-Tech Fertility: Laws & Ethics Lag, ORANGE
Cry. REGISTER, June 5, 1995, at Al ("'There is a lesbian-mother boom,' said Barbara
Raboy, director of the Sperm Bank of California in Berkeley, a nonprofit clinic that has
seen at least 40 lesbian clients become pregnant in the past six months."); Janis Ian,
'Heather Has Two Mommies, THE ADVOCATE, May 14, 1996, at 63 ("I am drowning in the
lesbian baby boom, everyone I know is having one, inundating me with diaper talk and
deep decisions.").
171. This may go a long way in accounting for the lack of visibility. Medicine has had
primary control over both procreative technology use and the discourse about its use. See
RAYMOND, supra note 2, at 108-37 (discussing the collaboration of science and media in
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is how do these technology uses and these relationships disrupt domi-
nant concepts used to define procreation and family, and what follows
from the disruption.
Consider lesbians who bear and raise children. The fact that wo-
men bear and raise children outside of marriage at least suggests that
marriage-based family is not the only model. The labels used for
these families send the message that the marriage-based family is nor-
mal, and other family structures are not. "Family" is used to refer to a
marriage-based family structure. "Single-parent household" is used to
distinguish the mother-child based family structure from "family."
Similarly, "single mother" is distinguished from "mother." The labels,
"single-parent household" and "single mother" contain assumptions
about how this family structure came to be-by divorce or unintended
unwed pregnancy. "Single-parent household" implies a broken fam-
ily, with the rupture occurring either before or after marriage, but al-
ways with reference to marriage. Intentional unwed pregnancy and
childrearing does not quite fit the assumptions behind "single-parent
household." The family formation denies the implication of fracture.
Intentional pregnancy and childrearing by lesbians who use do-
nor, alternative, or self-insemination challenge the normative content
of "family" more directly.1 72 When a heterosexual woman, particu-
larly the college-educated white woman over twenty years old who
represents the recent increase in unwed mothers, chooses to become a
single mother, we can still read the possibility of marriage and "nor-
malcy" into her future. Or we can provide explanations for her devi-
ant fertility that refer to marriage-she just couldn't find the right
man. In other words, this single mother's identity is still made contin-
gent on a male presence. But we cannot read a male presence into the
lesbian woman who chooses to become a mother. With or without a
woman partner, this family structure asserts itself as intact and defies
the reference to marriage and the necessity of a male presence. Lesbi-
the marketing of new reproductive technologies); DOROTHY NELKIN, SELLING SCIENCE:
How THE PRESS COVERS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 173-74 (1987) (characterizing the
relationship between scientists and the media as a promotional model). Use occurring
independent of medicine is likely to go unnoticed.
172. Insemination appears to be the most commonly used technology. Some have
pointed out that other, high tech methods would enable a lesbian couple to share the bio-
logical connections of procreation. "[T]he technology of cross-uterine egg transplants,
although highly regulated economically, finally allows a lesbian to give birth to another
lesbian's child, a fact that to date has gone entirely unmentioned by either the medical
community or the media." Cathy Griggers, Lesbian Bodies in the Age of (Post)mechanical
Reproduction, in FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY 178,
182-83 (Michael Warner ed., 1993).
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ans who decide to have children challenge the use of "motherhood" to
maintain a particular set of gender relationships. 173 The practice also
claims entitlement to the credentials of womanhood that have been
conflated with motherhood. So pushing the boundaries of mother-
hood may move it away from marriage. And it may naturalize lesbi-
ans as women.174
Consider the links between women and procreative technology.
Procreative technology use, within the dominant parts of the dis-
courses, reproduces motherhood as a cultural system that maintains
social control of women, essentializes woman with respect to her ca-
pacity to bear children, and devalues maternal labor. The technology
is also used in ways that reinforces the inscription of gender roles on
biological function, and further, to segment those parts and roles so
that both body and identity become component parts. 75 Lesbians
who use the technologies lay claim to identity parts denied them in the
dominant discourse-womanhood and motherhood-by manipulating
the splintering effect of the technologies. The result, lesbian mother-
hood, may be both transgressive and assimilated.176 The transgressive
use of technology, in turn, flips the human/invention distinction on its
head. 177 Lesbian use of the technology inscribes lesbian identity on
the technology-hence, low tech lesbians who use insemination, not
artificial insemination, to create family. What this suggests is that the
liminal position within the discourses may be manipulated for self-
definition.178
173. Lewin, On the Outside Looking In, in CONCEIVING THE NEW WORLD ORDER,
supra note 2, at 117.
174. Id. at 116.
175. Griggers, supra note 172, at 182.
176. There may be a risk that procreative technology use by lesbians may be read in
ways that reinscribe existing boundaries. For example, lesbians who have children may be
recognized as "women," but at the cost of holding the woman-line against lesbians who are
not mothers. See Lewin, On the Outside Looking In, in CONCEIVING THE NEw WORLD
ORDER, supra note 2, at 115. See also Shelley A.M. Gavigan, A Parent(ly) Knot: Can
Heather Have Two Mommies?, in LEGAL INVERSIONs: LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE
POLrICS OF LAW 102, 108 (Didi Herman & Carl Stychin eds., 1995) (arguing that in the
context of custody cases between lesbians, the language of assimilation versus anti-assimi-
lation proves inapt).
177. It also counters the usual practice of technology, which makes "deviant subjects"
of lesbians, gay men, people of color, women, and poor people. For an analysis of how
science makes deviant subjects of lesbians and gay men, see Jennifer Terry, The Seductive
Power of Science in the Making of Deviant Subjectivity, in POSTHUMAN BODIEs, supra note
2, at 135.
178. For a more extensive discussion of the multiplicity of lesbian identities and the de-
essentializing effects of the multiplicity, see Griggers, supra note 172, at 183-84.
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]IV. Boundary Rules and Liminal Identities
Tracing the pattern of connections in the in/fertility discourses
leads me to note that some identities and positions within the dis-
courses are more contingent than others. They are more liminal, with
fewer fixed points. They are able to shift more easily as a result. This
liminality has at least two possible uses. The first is suggested by the
multiple images attached to white, middle class women. These stories
and images do two things. They merge the technological imperative,
the default to science, with the ideology of family. And they act as
wedges to maintain boundaries against women of color, particularly
poor women, and lesbians. The second is suggested by the splintering
of inscribed lesbian identity when lesbians become mothers through
procreative technologies. The splintering indicates that the essential-
izing concepts within womanhood can be subverted. We can use
liminality as a prism to break up and recompose our identities.
Think about the moments in which the positions of white, middle
class women were saved from being too problematic by comparison to
others. The unnaturalness of high tech women seems natural when
contrasted with procreative technology use by lesbians. The age of
postmenopausal women who seek to have children becomes a virtue
relative to the harms unwed teenage mothers will wreak on their chil-
dren. Also think about the situations in which white, middle class wo-
men become inbetweens. Infertile women as women who should be
mothers are positioned as service workers relative to men, whose la-
bor is productive given their power over procreation. On the other
hand, infertile women have the ability to transfer the most oppressive
labor by employing true service laborers-domestic workers. Or the
college-educated, over-twenty unwed mothers-their sexual activity
and fertility out of wedlock makes them deviant. But they are distin-
guishable from the real unwed mothers-poor, women of color. The
natural-by-comparison and the inbetweenness of these identities
makes them liminal or fluid and contingent, even while particular
points-white, middle class, and woman-remain fixed.
A. Boundary Rules
The contingencies depend on the norms under question. In the
natural-by-comparison examples, questions about whether the tech-
nology should be used are diverted to the conclusion that these wo-
men should be mothers, and the dominant norms are reinforced by
pointing to their opposites. The high tech, low tech comparison, privi-
leges the technology itself by strengthening the association between
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the technology and the particular use of perpetuating marriage-based
family. The granny mom, unwed teenage mother comparison makes
the technologically-formed family more desirable than the sociologi-
cally-formed family because of the traits-money, marriage, and
whiteness-that gave the 59 year old woman technology access in the
first place. So, money and the ideology of marriage-based family be-
come both the means and the justifications for the technology use.
I believe that we should be able to ask the question that keeps
disappearing from the discourse-whether the technology should be
used. To sustain a dialogue about that question, we need to unwrap
the ideology of family from the technology. Exposing the pattern of
connections is just one step. So I cannot, by myself, say what the
boundaries of use should be. I doubt that we should or could ban all
procreative technology use. The desire for children and family is real,
as is the pain caused by inability to create those relationships. On the
other hand, we can question the ideology of family. The family forma-
tion imperative aimed at the white middle class has the effect of per-
petuating heteropatriarchy and race and class-based eugenic goals.
And, as discussed, the privileging of marriage-based family over
others contributes to the strategy of shifting attention away from the
structural problems that cause poverty and corrode the significance of
life and law, to the individual choices of those who live with these
problems. In other words, the question we may need to ask is, how
should the technology be used. This would change our understanding
of who should have access.
As we address the question of whether and how technology
should be used, we should take seriously the concerns pushed aside by
the drives for money and family. There are health concerns that we
might currently recognize as concrete and significant. But there are
other concerns that we usually dismiss too easily as lacking in con-
creteness-the erasures of woman's body, mind, and future that oc-
curs in practices like egg donation and the testimony of those, like
Anna Johnson, who have been harmed.179 I am, in short, pushing for
an approach that will probably result in bans on some practices, and
limitations placed on others. But I am pushing for an approach-ad-
dressing the question and doing so in a way that acknowledges the
patterns of connections in the discourses- not particular end results.
179. See RAYMOND, supra note 2, at 114 (commenting on how the accounts of surro-
gacy omit the numbers and testimony of dissatisfied customers and unhappy surrogates,
and observing how the impact of available testimony is minimized by characterizing the
dissatisfied and unhappy as isolated cases).
B. Wedges and Prisms
When white, middle class women are described as inbetweens,
the contradictions in their identities have the primary effect of perpet-
uating the unprivileged status of the other, rather than undermining
their relative privilege. The Murphy Browns may feel the effects of
social condemnation. But they are also used to locate the real harm
behind the race and class lines. As wedges, the liminality of white
middle class women uphold as well as hold down. Their whiteness and
middle class status work to privilege these women. But their gender,
and in particular, their position as women who should be mothers, has
the effect of maintaining white male privilege. This happens largely
by inscribing these women in marriage-based families, which require
the presence and authority of white men.
Lesbian mothers, and probably gay fathers, also occupy contra-
dictory and potentially manipulable positions in the discourses. Trac-
ing the connections disrupted by lesbian procreative technology use
indicates that women can reposition themselves in ways that under-
mine essentializing concepts in womanhood and motherhood. This
seems to occur by using the contradictions to fracture rather than to
compare identity constructs. "Lesbian mother" is a hybrid identity
constructed from two categories "normally" understood as mutually
exclusive. The fact that some lesbians may achieve recognition as
mothers, and therefore as women, does not fix things. To some ex-
tent, it may harden other lines, such as the exclusion of lesbians with-
out children from womanhood. But hopefully, the existence and
recognition of lesbian mothers brings the essentializing aspects of wo-
man and mother closer to the light, and implies that multiplicity is just
as possible as exclusivity.
Alexander Doty has defined "queerness" as "a quality related to
any expression that can be marked as contra-, non-, or anti-
straight."'u 0 He is not advocating simply taking an oppositional stand-
point-that would reinforce the existing boundaries. He suggests, mn-
stead, the potential of creating contradiction, of using liminality as a
standpoint position' 8' to enable self-definition. Technology use may
enhance our opportunities for creating contradiction because it so eas-
ily shifts the line between human and invention. Procreative technol-
ogy use has made the separation of biological from social function and
180. ALEXANDER DOTY, MAKING THINGS PERFECTLY QUEER: INTERPRETING MASS
CULTURE XV (1993).
181. See also Lisa Lowe, Heterogenity, Hybridity, Multiplicity: Harking Asian Ameri-
can Differences, 1 DIASPORA 24 (1991).
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the rearrangement of the biological-social correlations seem more
concrete. So lesbians and others may pick and choose the component
parts in defining their lives.'82
The question then arises, how do we create liminality for those in
positions apparently fixed by the fusion of race, gender, and class-
the too fertile women of color. It may be that Doty's work on inter-
preting mass culture to undermine the apparent inevitability of
straight or white or middle class or male content of culture offers one
approach. There must certainly be other ways to subvert identities
drawn on us. This type of work cannot depend entirely on those
whose imposed identities fix them in the margins to first gain access or
power. Those less marginalized can collaborate with those in the far
margins to subvert the boundaries that hold them there. But that, in
turn, will require those of us who can collaborate from a position of
relative privilege to recognize and resist those moments when we
might become wedges.
Conclusion
In tracing the pattern of connections that first emerge in these
moments of unease, to the medical and legal rules that express the
official boundaries of use, to the implicit boundaries formed by the
identity constructs of the in/fertile, the too fertile, and the dysfertile, I
have said much about procreative technology use. But while I began
thinking about procreative technology use, that is not where I ended.
The dynamics of discourse that I have observed are in some ways par-
ticular to in/fertility. But I believe the possibilities suggested by using
liminality as a wedge or a prism exist beyond in/fertility.
182. I am not necessarily advocating more procreative technology use. Rather I use
this example to illustrate the point about the positive potential of liminality.

